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PREFACE 
This project examines the experience of a single labor 
union, the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union 
(ILGWU), in Los Angeles during the New Deal era. Comparisons 
are drawn between local and national developments within the 
ILGWU and the American labor movement in general. 
Surprisingly little effort has been made to test prevailing 
historical interpretations within specific cities-- especially 
those lying outside of the industrial northeast. Until more 
localized research is undertaken, the unique organizational 
struggles of thousands of working men and women will remain 
ill-understood. Differences in regional politics, economics, 
ethnicity, and leadership defy the application of broad-based 
generalizations. 
The Los Angeles ILGWU offers an excellent example of a 
group that did not conform to national trends. While the 
labor movement experienced remarkable success throughout much 
of the United States, the Los Angeles garment locals failed to 
achieve their basic goals. Although eastern clothing workers 
won every important dispute with owners and bargained from a 
position of strength, their disunited southern Californian 
counterparts languished under the counterattacks of business 
interests. No significant gains in ILGWU membership occurred 
in Los Angeles after 1933, and the open shop survived well 
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into the following decade. A powerful minority of cloak and 
dress manufacturers and a majority of sportswear producers 
never signed a labor contract. Many firms that recognized the 
union broke the terms of their agreements when it became clear 
that they could do so with near impunity. Wages and working 
conditions received modest improvement despite a series of 
violent strikes that created a tragic spectacle for Los 
Angeles residents. Overshadowed by other concerns, such as 
presidential campaigns, economic crises, and the growth of 
fascism abroad, these confrontations went almost unnoticed 
outside the state of California. 
I extend my sincere thanks to the members of my 
committee, Dr. Roger Biles, Dr. Ronald Petrin, and Dr. 
Elizabeth Williams, for their thoughtful criticism and advice. 
Each provided suggestions that helped me to organize my 
thinking and avoid important mistakes and omissions. Any 
remaining flaws are my own. 
I also want to thank Martha Hodges and Grant Whitney at 
Cornell University, and Mary Tyler at the Southern California 
Library for their assistance. Professor Peter Laslett at UCLA 
gave me his advice and portions of his own unpublished 
manuscript, for which I am indebted. I am particularly 
grateful for the support of my wife, Dawn, who offered 
encouragement and understanding to an often preoccupied-- and 
always eccentric-- husband. 
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CHAPTER I 
LABOR ISSUES AND THE NEW DEAL 
Historians have long focussed upon the New Deal era as a 
critical turning point in the development of organized labor. 
Over the course of five decades, scholars have concentrated on 
an array of controversial topics that provide the substance 
for considerable interpretational quarreling. For the purpose 
of this study, the writer has selected a number of major 
issues that relate to the specific case to be investigated: 
The International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) in 
Los Angeles. The following pages will survey federal 
legislation, the reaction of management to unionization, the 
political left, the rivalry between the AFL and the CIO, and 
the United States labor movement in general. This essay and 
the following chapter about the ILGWU at the national level 
will provide a historical background with which conditions in 
the Los Angeles garment district may be compared. Although 
the union experience of the Ladies' Garment Workers in Los 
Angeles was in many respects characteristic of that witnessed 
nationally, evidence indicates that they failed to fully join 
in the overall success enjoyed by the larger labor movement. 
The reasons for this failure were numerous, but the strength 
of resisting anti-labor forces and the weaknesses of the local 
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ILGWU leadership may be isolated as crucial ones. 
In the years after World War One the unionization 
movement suffered a steady decline, first during the postwar 
economic boom and then under the Great Depression. Between 
1929 and 1933, membership dropped from 3.6 to 2.9 million, a 
decline made more damaging by the fact that thousands of 
registered workers no longer paid their dues.1 The 
legislation sponsored by New Dealers, more than any other 
single factor, changed the fortunes of the union movement and 
allowed it to grow to new heights of power and prestige. 
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After occupying the oval office for only three months, 
Franklin Roosevelt signed into law the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA) as part of his effort to revive the 
collapsed economy. The president hoped to initiate 
cooperation between labor and business through collective 
bargaining, thus restoring the nation's prosperity. Roosevelt 
requested that employers in each branch of industry draft 
codes of fair competition that would end destructive fighting 
between owners and address the grievances of laborers. 
Section 7(a) of the law included three provisions: First, 
that employees had the right to select their own 
representatives free of employer intimidation; second, that no 
employee could be forced to join a company union; and third, 
that employers must comply with the president's minimum wage 
and maximum hour rates, and any other conditions approved by 
the executive.2 
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The vague wording of the labor clause resulted in 
immediate disputes over its precise meaning. Labor leaders 
viewed section 7{a) as their "Magna Charta," granting the 
unions legal legitimacy and outlawing the open shop. When 
business representatives across the country asserted their own 
interpretations that protected the status quo, the result was 
ironic but predictable. Strikes, part of the very industrial 
"aggression" that FDR had hoped to eliminate, erupted 
nationwide.3 The National Labor Board created by the NIRA 
floundered under the resulting avalanche of cases and lacked 
the power to take effective action.4 The Recovery Act granted 
the Board no authority to impose criminal penalties, so that 
manufacturers felt free to defy the spirit of the law. The 
Roosevelt administration felt relief when in May, 1935 the 
Supreme Court ruled the NIRA unconstitutional in the Schechter 
decision, clearing the way for an improved labor code.5 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) or Wagner Act, 
the "most radical labor legislation ever enacted" according to 
its opponents, was signed into law on July 5, 1935. Drafted 
by Senator Robert Wagner of New York to prevent the "unfair 
labor practices" that existed under the flawed NIRA, the bill 
was initially opposed by FDR. Soon after the Senate passed 
the Wagner Act, however, the president changed his mind and 
gave his support-- with the votes of industrial workers in 
mind. In clear language the new law recognized the right of 
laborers to bargain collectively, to speak freely in 
advocating unionism, to elect representatives without 
harassment or coercion, and to protest unfair practices by 
employers and seek compensation.6 Although it was not until 
1937 that the Supreme Court upheld the Act, the ultimate 
effectiveness of the NLRA was considerable. During its first 
ten years of operation, a reconstructed National Labor 
Relations Board tried over 70,000 cases involving "unfair 
labor practices" and labor representation. The Board 
monitored some 24,000 elections, allowed 300,000 workers to 
return to work after illegal dismissal, and awarded millions 
of dollars in back pay.7 
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The Wagner Act was the culmination of several decades of 
legislative effort and included modifications first pioneered 
in a number of lesser prototypes. Congress strengthened its 
labor initative by adding the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), 
which broadened limitions on child labor and assigned new 
minimum wage and maximum hour rates.8 From the start, 
manufacturers recognized and resented the threat posed by New 
Deal labor laws, and resisted unionization by various means 
throughout the New Deal era. 
Manufacturers often reacted to labor legislation by 
simply ignoring it and then using every legal challenge or 
appeal at their disposal if workers filed a complaint. Labor 
itself had critized the NRA, calling it the "National Run 
Around" because of the system's inefficiency. By 1935 almost 
everyone regarded the act as a failure and businessmen 
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resisted even mild attempts to enforce its provisions. Few of 
the NRA codes ever submitted by business groups met government 
standards, demonstrating that often even cooperative 
capitalists would yield to administration policies only in 
part.9 During the first two years after the passage of the 
Wagner Act-- and longer in some cases-- employers violated the 
new law openly, assuming that it too would be overturned in 
the courts. The Guffey-Snyder Actj an attempt to restore 
articles of the NRA over the coal industry, fell before the 
Supreme Court in late 1935, strengthening manufacturers' 
resolve to resist labor legislation. But the High Court 
upheld the NLRA after the La Follette Committee's disclosures 
of .anti-labor conspiracies and Roosevelt's "court packing" 
attempt, resulting in a sobering awakening for business. 
Rapidly, with an efficient National Labor Relations Board, 
open disobedience became an unviable option.10 
Another common method of combating labor organization was 
the creation of company unions under the control of business 
management. Although both section 7(a) and the Wagner Act 
that replaced it called for an end to employer interference in 
collective bargaining, hundreds of major companies founded or 
reactivated "representation plans." Between 1933 and 1935, 
company unions actually grew faster than trade unions and 
enrolled about 2.5 million workers. It was not until 1940 
that the company union movement fell into decline-- largely as 
a result of the disclosures of "employer interferences" made 
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by Senator Robert La Follette's investigating subcommittee.11 
In addition to the company union, businesses utilized 
other traditional weapons against militant working men and 
women. Employers united in newly formed manufacturers' 
associations to coordinate strategies for preserving the open 
shop-- both legal and illegal.12 The circulation of 
blacklists prevented the hiring of known troublemakers, and 
whitelists provided the names of "reliable" prospective 
employees. Businessmen also used their privilege to discharge 
laborers "for any or no reason" to weed out known union 
members and to intimidate others who might be thinking of 
joining. As property owners, businessmen claimed the right to 
padlock shops and factories for any reason, using such 
lo~kouts to starve resisting employees into submission.13 
Besides and often in conjunction with the methods already 
mentioned was the use of violence to protect company property 
and to "maintain law and order." Munitions makers made a 
fortune by catering to nervous employers, and in 1935 one said 
that he hoped " a hell of a strike would get under way." In 
1937, Republic Steel owned "552 revolvers, 64 rifles, 245 
shotguns, 145 gas guns, 4,033 gas projectiles, 2,707 gas 
grenades, and an undetermined number of night sticks and gas 
revolvers."14 Employees resented these private arsenals and 
the armies of strikebreakers and guards that accompanied them, 
and their increased anger made strikes likelier. At San 
Francisco shipyards, Chicago steel plants, North Carolina 
textile mills, and elsewhere, hired policemen gunned down 
scores of strikers and clubbed and gassed hundreds of others. 
When the La Follette Committee questioned business 
representatives about the use of lethal force, the most 
frequent justification they gave was. the need to counteract 
the activities of Communists and other subversive elements.15 
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The task of analyzing the role of the left in organized 
labor is made difficult by the varying usages of the term 
"left." An essay jointly written by two historians included 
the following list of radical groups active in unionization 
drives during FDR's presidency: "Communists, Socialists, 
Trotskyites, members of the Proletarian party and the 
Revolutionary Workers' League, New America supporters, 
Lovestoneites ••• old time 'wobblies' and Socialist Labor party 
members and syndicalists •••• "16 Other writers have included 
New Deal Democrats and liberals of various stripes in an even 
broader definition. Many seem to believe that all those who 
advocated labor unions belonged to an amorphous leftist camp. 
This discussion will emphasize the Communists, because they 
were the most influential group and have received the most 
attention by historians. As later chapters will reveal, the 
Communists (and to a less clear extent, the Socialists) played 
an important role in the attempt to organize the Los Angeles 
garment industry.17 
Prior to 1935, the largest radical labor organization in 
the United States was the Communists' Trade Union Unity League 
8 
(TUUL) with 125,000 members. Included in the TUUL was the 
Needle Trades Union, which competed with the ILGWU and the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union for the support of garment 
workers in every major center of clothing manufacture. During 
this period of dual unionist policy, the TUUL and its 
affiliates sought to disrupt and discredit the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) , thus wresting control of the labor 
movement from the "social fascists."18 After 1935 the 
Communists dissolved the TUUL and sought to "bore from 
within," hoping to gain control of the AFL and the emerging 
Congress (initially "Committee") of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO) by infiltrating the rank and file and then assuming 
leadership positions.19 
. There has been considerable disagreement over the 
strength of Communist power in the union movement, especially 
within the CIO, during the New Deal. One contemporary writer 
flatly denied reports of a strong Communist presence within 
Lewis's organization, stating that "Communist influence within 
the CIO is a figment of imagination."20 At the same time 
another labor expert declared that "Stalinism is a danger in 
the CIO," and hinted that the reds might possess the real 
leadership while hiding behind figureheads.21 Still another 
writer asserted that John L. Lewis maintained strong control 
of the CIO and merely used the Communists for their organizing 
skills-- which appears to be the consensus view.22 When taken 
to task by David Dubinsky of the ILGWU for his use of 
Communists, Lewis is said to have remarked, "Who gets the 
bird, the hunter or the dog?"23 
The contention that the Communists concentrated their 
main efforts upon the CIO and left the AFL in relative peace 
has been periodically challenged. Although CP members never 
penetrated the Federation's national leadership, the 
Communists enjoyed considerable success in controlling 
isolated union locals.24 They achieved a substantial degree 
of authority among AFL machinists, printers, and 
needleworkers, because traditional socialist ideologies 
remained strong within those groups. In all of these cases 
the Communists served as tenuous leaders of coalitions, 
usually maintaining a low political profile.25 
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Historical assessments of the success of Communist 
participation in the labor movement depend as much upon the 
writer's own political views as anything else. Often, 
critical scholars attribute the party's victories to its 
dishonorable, covert strategy, and consider the Communists 
failures because mastery of the labor movement eluded them.26 
CP obedience to the orders of the Soviet Comintern, which 
caused it to radically reverse major policy positions 
involving politics and labor strategy, is cited as proof that 
the organization was un-American. In addition, opponents have 
used the immigrant origins of a large percentage of CP members 
to label them as creators of a foreign political movement in 
the United States.27 Other sources praise the Communists for 
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the invaluable role they played in organizing workers and view 
their internationalist convictions as a strength instead of a 
weakness. New Left historians praise the party for its stand 
in favor of racial equality, but sometimes criticize its 
"sacrifice [of a] consistent approach of building socialism in 
this country in order to support policies determined in 
Russia."28 Regardless of how the efforts of Communist labor 
organizers are judged, it is usually conceded that the 
Communists formed the most effective radical labor group. 
They successfully gained a foothold in hundreds of labor 
organizations, where they exercised varying degrees of 
influence. Even within the ILGWU, led by the renowned 
red-hater Dubinsky, individual Communists won positions of 
responsibility during the Depression years-- but usually at 
the price of concealing their political convictions.29 
Before leaving the subject of the left, it would be 
remiss not to mention the union activities of the Socialists. 
The most remarkable aspect of the Socialist party's effort to 
build support within the labor movement was its complete 
failure. At the advent of the New Deal era the Socialist 
party enjoyed its greatest strength within the needle trades 
and hoped to restore the allegiance of the machinists, 
brewers, shoemakers, and mine workers who had followed Eugene 
v. Debs in years past. Allied with the Jewish Daily Forward, 
David Dubinsky, Sidney Hillman, and other Socialist labor 
leaders sponsored a Congress of Workers and Farmers in order 
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to exploit the growing discontent among laborers. The result 
was a fiasco, and the Socialist support within the needle 
trades shifted gradually to FDR. Dubinsky himself allowed his 
party affiliation to lapse and became a staunch New Deal 
advocate. Other old-time Socialists remained active within 
the labor movement, but did so as individuals instead of as 
party representatives.30 
In addition to the issue of the left, the rivalry between 
William Green's AFL and John Lewis's CIO remains one of the 
most discussed and debated dramas in American labor history. 
The rift that emerged affected the growth and direction of 
organized labor in profound ways, with both positive and 
negative results. As one of the new giants of industrial 
unionism, the ILGWU became directly involved in the fraternal 
quarrel that grew into a lengthy civil war. 
The dispute began in 1934, when a large minority faction 
within the AFL began advocating a change in union 
organization. The previous year had brought dramatic 
increases in membership and a renewed spirit of militancy 
among workers who interpreted section 7(a) of the NIRA as a 
call to action. John L. Lewis, AFL vice-president and head of 
the United Mine Workers (UMW), also sensed that a great 
opportunity was at hand and demanded a major recruiting effort 
on the part of the AFL. Lewis, Dubinsky, and other leaders 
called for industrial unionism that would organize the great 
multitudes of unskilled laborers whose jobs were products of 
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twentieth century mechanization. For fifty-five years the AFL 
had organized skilled craftsmen, and Federation elders 
resisted admitting groups that they considered inferior. This 
included millions of unskilled workers in mass-production 
industries like steel, lumber, automobiles, and rubber. After 
a year of sluggish action by Green, Lewis made deliberate 
moves to cause a schism at the AFL convention of 1935.31 
At the convention's opening, Lewis and his allies 
tendered a resolution calling for an immediate change to 
industrial unionism, and the UMW chief delivered an 
impassioned speech on its behalf. Lewis concluded with the 
ringing words: " ••• heed this cry from Macedonia that comes 
from the hearts of men. Organize the unorganized!" The 
convention delegates responded by promptly voting the measure 
down by a wide margin, to the glee of AFL conservatives. 
After punching Carpenters' Union boss William Hutcheson in the 
mouth during a heated debate, Lewis retired to form his 
Committee for Industrial Organization and to prepare for 
battle.32 
Events then moved toward nationwide conflict. The CIO 
began issuing charters to steel, auto, and rubber workers, 
causing Green to demand its dissolution and an end to 
unauthorized dual unionism. Lewis and his associates ignored 
the order and in August, 1936, the AFL's Executive Counc:l 
ejected the ten CIO unions from their parent organization.33 
Dubinsky's ILGWU became an important component within the CIO 
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until 1938, when Lewis announced the creation of a "permanent 
national organization," formalizing the rift in the labor 
movement. Strongly believing in a united cause, Dubinsky 
returned to the AFL and helped swing the balance of power in 
the Federation's favor.34 The AFL won clear numerical 
superiority over the CIO and by 1941 some sources estimated 
that it was twice as large. The retirement of Lewis and the 
gradual realization of AFL dominance ultimately led to 
unification.35 
Hostility between the AFL and the CIO continued 
throughout the New Deal era producing mixed results. The most 
positive aspect of the rivalry was the great expansion in 
union membership. The CIO staged monumental sit-down strikes 
in which workers physically occupied factories to prevent the 
use of scab labor. Although this tactic was illegal, it 
forced many owners, especially in the auto and steel 
industries, to accept the closed shop. Pressured by the huge 
successes of the CIO, AFL leaders began their own recruiting 
campaign. One branch of the AFL, the Teamsters, rose in 
membership from 95,500 to 350,000, and other affiliates 
enjoyed similar gains.36 Less beneficial was the great loss 
of energy that both sides expended in attacking each other and 
in competing for the same recruits. Enemies of the labor 
movement capitalized on the public squabbling of the period 
and succeeded in gradually swaying considerable public opinion 
against the unions. This contributed to the anti-labor 
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backlash during the 1940's and 1950's.37 
Overwhelmingly, historians agree that the New Deal era 
represented a period of growth and prosperity for organized 
labor. Union membership nearly tripled, climbing from roughly 
three million to nine million by 1941.38 Thousands of blacks 
shared in the revitalized movement, which more than doubled 
the number of organized transportation, factory, and mine 
workers.39 Union treasuries swelled, allowing leaders to 
formulate elaborate social programs and contribute extravagant 
sums to charities and political campaigns. Collective 
bargaining forced employers to listen to the complaints of 
employees and led to improved working conditions and wage 
levels. Ultimately, cooperation between business and labor 
reduced industrial conflict to the benefit of postwar society. 
Organized labor became a political force and emerged as a 
powerful element in the new Democratic coalition.40 At the 
root of all these developments was powerful federal 
legislation that legitimized unions, set standards for wages 
and hours, and purged the working place of many evils as old 
as industrialization itself. At the same time, changes came 
slowly to many communities that lay removed from the 
industrial centers of the north. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ILGWU DURING THE NEW DEAL 
In order to gain an understanding of the emergence of the 
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) as one of 
the giants of organized labor, it is necessary to explore two 
historical avenues. One must traverse three stormy decades of 
struggle (1900-1930) that concluded with a bankrupt union 
facing destruction. The formative experiences of the man who 
then rebuilt it are also of critical importance. Educated in 
the ruthless garment industry of New York's Lower East Side, 
David Dubinsky used his intimate knowledge of the needle 
trades and an innate determination, intellect, and charisma to 
conquer what appeared to be impossible odds. As the union's 
new president in 1932, Dubinsky arrived to find disconnected 
telephones, frozen elevators, and a $750,000 debt.1 
Exploiting the opportunities offered by New Deal legislation 
and growing worker discontent, this stocky little immigrant 
revived and transformed the ILGWU and became the world 
renowned leader of an influential institution. 
The scandalous working conditions that prompted the 
creation of the ILGWU and its sister organizations were 
already acute some twenty years before the future union 
president reached American shores. In 1890 Jacob A. Riis 
wrote the following description of New York's garment 
district: 
Take the Second Avenue Elevated Railroad at Chatham 
Square and ride up half a mile through the sweaters' 
district. Every open window of the big tenements, 
that stand like a continuous brick wall on both 
sides of the way, gives you a glimpse of these shops 
as the train speeds by. Men and women bend over the 
machines, or ironing clothes at the window, 
half-n~ked •••• The road is like a big gangway 
through an endless work-room where vast multitudes 
are forever laboring. Morning, noon, or night, it 
makes no difference; the scene is always the same.2 
19 
Working hours were often unlimited in the worst garment shops, 
and laborers operated their machines until exhaustion overtook 
them. During the busy season men sometimes worked all night, 
and the streets of New York filled at four a.m. with clothing 
workers on their way to the factories. Forced to buy their 
own sewing machines and thread, employees paid the owners for 
the electricity to run them and were subject to fines for a 
variety of minor infractions. A serious offense, such as 
arriving to work late, might result in termination or the loss 
of three hours' pay. Protest was to no avail, because owners 
found an endless supply of labor at the "Pig Market"-- the 
informal labor exchange around Essex and Hester Streets. A 
worker knew his boss had fired him if he arrived for work one 
morning and found his machine sitting near the door.3 
By the turn of the century, Italians and Jews of the "new 
immigration" dominated the garment trades, having replaced 
earlier established groups because of their willingness to 
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accept lower wages. Of the two groups, it was predictably the 
Jews who took the lead in the task of organizing for reform. 
Hailing from eastern Europe, many Jews possessed political 
education and union experience gained from membership in 
underground organizations such as the General Jewish workers 
Union, Labor Zion, and the Socialist Bund. As a result of the 
danger of arrest and the lack of basib civil rights in Russia 
and Poland, many young radicals numbered among the 100,000 
Jews who migrated to the United States each year. 
Disenchanted with the exploitation and squalor they found in 
the New World, many former subjects of the Tsar became members 
of the newborn ILGWU in 1900 and the years that followed.4 
During the first eight years of its existence, the 
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union fought merely to 
survive. The concerted resistance of manufacturers and 
recurring economic recessions undermined the faith of the 
membership and made hard-won concessions unenforceable. At 
the end of this period, as union officials seriously debated 
the dissolution of their International, mass demonstrations in 
the garment districts of New York, Chicago, Boston, and 
Philadelphia rescued and invigorated the ILGWU.5 
The New York shirtwaist workers' famous "Uprising of the 
20,000" in 1909 established a permanent foothold for a union 
founded less than a decade earlier with 2000 members and a $30 
treasury. Beginning at several isolated factories, the strike 
soon engulfed over five hundred firms when the resolution to 
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wage a general walkout passed overwhemingly at a mass meeting. 
The great multitude of strikers shocked ILGWU leaders, who had 
estimated that perhaps 3,000 workers would respond. The union 
lacked the strike funds necessary to provide bail and 
subsistence for its picketers and had no prior experience in 
handling such a formidable mass of people. Officials 
conducted rallies and seminars in English, Yiddish, and 
Italian, and despite the renting of twenty-four auditoriums 
some workers stood in the street.6 
With the union on the brink of insolvency, the rich 
society women of the Women's Trade Union League (WTUL) arrived 
to save the day. League members marched with strikers to 
discourage police brutality and raised $49,000 in relief and 
bail money.7 Although the WTUL succeeded in arousing great 
public sympathy for the workers, some elements of the press 
refused to acknowledge the harsh reality of the conflict. 
Editors of the New York Times featured front-page stories 
discussing the Astor family yacht and a hundred-pound pie 
given to President Taft, but ignored the six-month ordeal on 
the city's East Side.8 
With the shirtwaistmakers' strike concluded, the ILGWU 
won several significant gains in what was labelled a mixed 
settlement. Most importantly, the union became the recognized 
negotiator for employees of 350 manufacturers, who agreea to a 
fifty-two hour week. These owners also promised to supply 
electric power and materials and pledged to end the petty 
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fines and penalties formerly levied in their shops. 
Unfortunately, the agreement failed to set standard wage rates 
or provide a system for the settlement of grievances, and 
within weeks the WTUL received reports of violations by the 
owners. A significant result of the conflict was the clear 
demonstration that women could unite in protest and remain 
resolute in the face of beatings, arrest, and imprisonment. 
It awakened.the conscience of the nation and established an 
enduring female majority within the ILGWU.9 
Other elements of the labor movement planned to mimic the 
tactics of the shirtwaist makers' locals even before the 
twenty-four week confrontation ended in a labor victory. 
Allied ILGWU cloakmakers paralyzed the industry when 55,000 
walked off the job in 1910 to begin one of the largest strikes 
in American history.10 The New York Times abandoned its 
earlier aloofness and admitted that the disturbance was 
"probably the largest strike in a single trade that has ever 
taken place in this city." Instead of reprinting earlier 
editorials defending the near-sanctity of the open shop, the 
Times bent to prevailing currents of opinion and supported the 
union, even furnishing copies of ILGWU daily instructions to 
picketers.11 After six financially damaging weeks of 
stalemate against a well-financed and growing foe, New York's 
cloak manufacturers agreed to negotiate. The settlement, 
entitled the Protocol of Peace, embodied the proposals of 
future Supreme Court justice Louis D. Brandeis. The workers 
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gained a 54-hour week, ten paid holidays, sanitation controls, 
limited over-time, and the "preferential union shop" that 
eventually became a complete closed shop. Employers 
recognized the ILGWU as the official union and accepted an 
organized system of reconciling grievances. Shortly 
thereafter, in 1911, nineteen year-old David Dubinsky stepped 
off a ship and into the victory-charged atmosphere of New 
York's working community.12 
The young man who clambered out of steerage and into the 
Empire City's Jewish ghetto had experienced more hardship·and 
adventure than his age suggested. By his early teens, 
Dubinsky had completed an apprenticeship and was considered a 
master baker in his native city of Lodz. Participation in a 
local bakers' union and the Jewish Socialist Party of Poland 
(the Bund) soon led to Russian jails, followed by a two-year 
march into Siberian exile. Unwilling to spend his remaining 
days in a desolate subarctic village, the prisoner escaped, 
returned to Lodz, and illegally trekked through Germany to the 
United States.13 Dubinsky's radical youth affected him for 
the rest of his life, causing him to adopt an enduring 
socialist outlook and commit his life to the fight against 
social and economic injustice. Subsequent experiences 
determined that unionism would be Dubinsky's tool to engender 
change.14 
A few weeks after his arrival, the horror of the Triangle 
Shirtwaist Company Fire confronted Dubinsky. The Triangle 
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Company, located on the top three floors of the Asch Building, 
had succeeded in defeating the union during the "Uprising of 
the 20,000" through the hiring of strikebreakers. As a 
result, the manufacturer denied employee demands for unlocked 
doors adjacent to the fire escapes-- fearing that ILGWU 
organizers would invade the shops and foment dissent. On 
March 25, just before the end of a shift, witnesses heard what 
was described as a muff led explosion. Minutes later smoke 
billowed from the Asch Building and shortly afterward 146 
women succumbed to smoke and flames or leaped to their deaths. 
Firemen unfolded cloth and rope safety nets in an effort to 
save the frightened women, but these broke unde~ the force of 
the victims' impact. That evening, the odor of blood pooling 
in the gutters panicked draft horses pulling wagonloads of 
coffins dispatched by the city. The ILGWU responded to the 
slaughter with sorrow and anger, calling a series of protest 
meetings that contributed to a $120,000 fund collected for 
burial costs and aid for the orphaned.15 
Shortly afterward-- perhaps in response to the tragedy--
Dubinsky rejected familial advice that he become a physician 
and began his training as a garment cutter. Still unable to 
communicate in English, the young Jew attended meetings of 
Local 10 of the ILGWU Cutters' Union and observed there the 
basic workings of an industrial labor organization.16 
Dubinsky's rise within Local 10 was rapid. He sat on the 
Local Executive Board by 1918, became vice-president in 1920 
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and president a year later, and emerged by 1922 as a leading 
figure in the New York labor movement and a member of the 
ILGWU National Executive Board. This remarkable acquisition 
of power was not achieved without political struggle. 
Dubinsky and his lieutenants demonstrated that the old-timers 
placed personal gain ahead of legitimate union interests and 
then systematically worked to eliminate them. Accepting 
minimal pay and devoting exhausting hours to their jobs, the 
new leadership ousted corrupt inefficient administrators.17 
Two factors contributed to the decline of the ILGWU in 
the years before Dubinsky's presidency: economic troubles and 
internal division. It is scarcely surprising that the Great 
Depression damaged the drive for labor organization in the 
United States, particularly in a fragile industry that 
suffered seriously during the recession of 1921.18 Equally 
disruptive was an internecine clash between a Communist 
faction led by Louis Hyman and President Morris Sigman's 
right-wing majority. In July, 1926, the Communists sponsored 
a general strike of suit and coat shops that the national 
union felt obligated to support. After a five-month deadlock, 
the Communist-dominated Strike Committee refused a "right-wing 
deviationist" solution and voted to continue striking to 
receive "a little more." The employers who had offered pay 
raises refused to buckle further, and with most of the season 
gone the panicked union accepted a clearly inferior contract. 
The Strike Committee agreed to grant manufacturers a free hand 
in firing workers and allowed the abolition of rules 
controlling the use of irresponsible subcontractors.19 
26 
Most observers agreed that the ILGWU was in a pitiable 
condition by the summer of 1932. The Communist faction had 
deserted the union and formed the Needle Trades Workers' 
Industrial Union, saddling the remnants of the .ILGWU with a 
million dollar debt accumulated during the failed general 
strike.20 Fewer than 40,000 members remained, and the 
shattered organization exerted little influence within the 
trade at large. At this juncture, President Benjamin 
Schlesinger (the successor of Morris Sigman) died after an 
extended illness and left David Dubinsky as the heir apparent. 
At an Executive Board meeting that June, eleven leading 
officials elected Secretary-Treasurer Dubinsky to the highest 
position in a union on the brink of oblivion.21 
The New Deal legislation of the Roosevelt Administration 
caused a rebirth of the American labor movement and 
represented the salvation of the ailing ILGWU. Dubinsky 
described the period following the passage of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) as "two months that shook the 
ladies' garment industry." Although the union was nearly 
penniless, the young president asked for volunteer organizers, 
resumed publicatic:n of the ILGWU journal Justice, and took the 
offensive by calling strikes in sixty cities.22 May brought 
Dubinsky's first victory in a strike waged against 
Philadelphia dress manufacturers, who had defeated the union 
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in a brutal confrontation the previous year. The news of a 
triumph boosted needle workers' morale across the nation, and 
thousands of unemployed men and women volunteered for unpaid 
service.23 
The union won its most momentous victory in the New York 
dress industry, which came to a complete standstill when 
60,000 employees walked out in the largest work stoppage in 
ILGWU history. The picketers demonstrated such complete 
solidarity that the employers gave in after four days and 
accepted revolutionary terms. Contracts reinstated the closed 
shop, granted pay raises, and included provisions controlling 
child labor, working hours, subcontracting practices, and the 
piecework system. In the aftermath of the event, the ILGWU 
experienced a phenomenal expansion in membership, with 40,000 
Italians, 4,000 Blacks, and 4,000 Hispanics joining 32,000 
other employees in accepting union cards. Dubinsky's staff 
spent the autumn months mopping up in smaller clothing trades 
such as the scarf, blouse, underwear, embroidery, and 
knit-goods industries. Strikes seldom lasted longer than two 
weeks, and in all cases substantial pay increases resulted.24 
At the ILGWU Chicago convention of 1934, the general 
executive board observed that "a veritable revolution" had 
occurred within the union. Membership stood at 200,000, 
eighty new locals operated under charter, and organization 
accounts contained a $500,000 surplus. Employers had improved 
wages, hours, and working conditions in most large 
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manufacturing centers, and increasing numbers of supposedly 
unorganizable blacks and chicanos joined the ranks. On the 
west coast, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle 
had witnessed major garment strikes and the creation of ILGWU 
locals.25 In the South clothing manufacturing had gradually 
increased and by the rnid-1930's about five hundred 
establishments existed there~ Texas became a major target for 
unionization, and Dallas workers waged three bitter strikes in 
1936. However, the ILGWU made its most decisive advances in 
the region during and after World War Two, and gained only 
three to four thousand Southern members under the New Deal.26 
With most of the industry organized, the great era of striking 
came to a close. Although Dubinsky and his union would face 
trials in the years ahead, never again would bankruptcy and 
disintegration threaten. As the third largest union in the 
American Federation of Labor, the International Ladies' 
Garment Workers' Union became a major power broker.27 
Aside from organization, one of the serious problems 
confronting Dubinsky during the New Deal (and later) was a 
continual battle against organized crime. Dating back to the 
1920's, gangsters had operated in the New York garment 
district, offering owners protection from unionization in 
return for a percentage of their profits. The ILGWU hired its 
own hoodlums in response, and after major strikes many 
criminals emerged as factory owners. Shops that had "the 
connections" enjoyed more flexible union regulations, and 
organizers foolish enough to make trouble there risked 
beatings or worse.28 
Louis "Lepke" Buchalter and Albert Anastasia were 
underworld thugs who made a fortune through garment rackets 
during the first decade of Dubinsky's tenure. The FBI rated 
Lepke as one of the most dangerous criminals in the country, 
but took years to make their case and eventually track him 
down. Said to have ordered the slaying of seventy people, 
Lepke annually collected a million dollars from garment 
racketeering alone-- before dying in Sing Sing's electric 
chair in 1941. Albert Anastasia owned a chain of garment 
factories as well as a large fleet of garment trucks. The 
controller of a mafia guild of professional assassins, 
Anastasia escaped prosecution for murder because repeatedly 
witnesses disappeared. Never serving a day in prison, "Big 
Al" died in a gang war over Cuban gambling in 1957.29 
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After taking office, Dubinsky waged constant war upon the 
gangsters, recognizing that union workers ultimately suffered 
from rampant extortion and substandard conditions in protected 
shops. Despite periodic campaigns against corruption, the 
mafia maintained a firm control over the ILGWU Truckers' Local 
and continued to extort money from manufacturers. Although 
aware that certain union officials consorted with elements of 
organized crime, Dubinsky felt powerless to demand their 
resignations. He knew that honest replacements for corrupt 
officials would either be bought or murdered. One trade 
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association executive complained, "They're (the mafia) an evil 
growth on the body of the industry. And I tell you, they'll 
never be eliminated."30 Unable to remove the hoodlums, 
Dubinsky pragmatically turned his energies to areas where 
success was attainable. 
Revealing the continued influence of his socialist 
background, Dubinsky revived and expanded ILGWU welfare 
programs. The union provided medical care through the 
six-floor Union Health Center,which eventually added health 
education and ambulance services. Since the 1920's, the ILGWU 
had maintained a summer resort for garment workers in the 
Pocono Hills of Pennsylvania. Dubinsky realized the value 
that the vacation complex represented in terms of organization 
pride and prestige, especially because it was the largest 
union retreat in the country. Not content to rest on its 
progressive laurels, the International established a death 
benefit fund and eventually provided sickness and 
hospitalization pay. Scrupulously honest, the union president 
stretched the value of each benefit dollar and kept 
administrative costs to a minimum.31 
From 1935 to 1938 the ILGWU took part in the great labor 
schism of the era, the AFL-CIO split. Led by John L. Lewis 
of the United Mine Workers, Dubinsky and several other labor 
bosses formed the Committee for Industrial Organization. 
Members of this group were committed to mass industrial 
unionism as opposed to the traditional trade unionism of the 
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AFL. Convinced that the AFL was missing great organizing 
opportunities through its hostility to change, the Committee 
began forming its own industrial unions, which the Federation 
rejected. After the resignation of Lewis as AFL 
vice-president and the lack of any reconciliation, the AFL 
suspended the CIO for dual unionism at its 193~ convention.32 
Dubinsky agonized over the decision to defy the AFL, but 
decided that his belief in industrial unionism took precedence 
over his warm feelings for the Federation. The ILGWU remained 
a part of the CIO until 1938, when Lewis abandoned all hopes 
for reunion and created the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations. In reaction to this move, Dubinsky removed his 
union from the CIO and led it as an independent force until a 
year and a half later, when the ILGWU reclaimed its place 
within the AFL. The garment union's president acted in this 
way, because he felt that a permanent division in the labor 
movement would prove a disaster, which it did. He realized 
that although the ILGWU had contributed its full share to CIO 
coffers, the International's influence within Committee 
councils had been limited. Rather than enjoy "a comfortable 
independence," Dubinsky felt duty-bound to rejoin the larger 
labor movement.33 While the ILGWU never quite took center 
stage during the AFL-CIO clash, the significant part it did 
play confirmed the growth of the union's power. Possession of 
the ILGWU's half-million members gave the AFL a clear 
numerical advantage over the CIO after 1939. 
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A final confirmation of increased ILGWU vitality was the 
organization's participation in national politics. Although 
in the midst of collecting funds to aid victims of the Spanish 
Civil War, Dubinsky backed the re-election of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt with vigor. Republicans supported by the Hearst 
press attempted to label Dubinsky a Communist, but the scheme 
failed miserably. FDR defended the ILGWU chief on a national 
radio broadcast, and newspapers publicized his record of 
defiance against.Communists within the union. In November 
most American citizens, like the garment workers, voted to 
re-elect Roosevelt, and David Dubinsky served as one of New 
York state's electors.34 
The story of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' 
Union during the New Deal was one of growth. The organization 
spread its influence across the United States and into Canada, 
and membership expanded five-fold. David Dubinsky, an unknown 
Jewish immigrant in 1932, became an internationally known 
leader who visited the White House and sponsored philanthropy 
at home and abroad. The union became active in the major 
labor struggles of the era and participated in national 
political campaigns. It even found time to sponsor its own 
Broadway musical, "Pins and Needles," which became a smash 
hit.35 Although the battle against organized crime proved 
futile and outside the International's traditional territory 
it sometimes received a bloody nose, the ILGWU enjoyed a 
golden age under the New Deal. 
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Several reasons for this success may be cited. Federal 
legislation supporting the legitimacy and rights of the 
American labor movement, especially section 7(a) of the NIRA 
and the NLRA, provided the legal protection and renewed 
confidence necessary for the great ILGWU offensives. Equally 
important was the superior leadership of President David 
Dubinsky, who· inspired the love and dedication of toiling 
multitudes and became a living symbol of the organization he 
directed. Finally, expansion would not have occurred without 
widespread discontent among laborers about perceived 
injustices within the industry and the pervasive lack of union 
affiliation that still existed. Had ladies' garment workers 
already been associated with a competing organization, there 
would not have been as large an unorganized labor pool for the 
ILGWU to exploit. The other great garment workers' union, the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, organized the 
employees of the men's and children's garment industry 
instead. Without this combination of advantageous conditions, 
-the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union-- like a 
seedling deprived of its environmental necessities-- would 
not have flowered. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ILGWU LOS ANGELES DRESSMAKERS' 
STRIKE OF 1933 
Morning greeted Los Angeles on the 12th of October, 
1933, revealing an unseasonably cool and cloudy day. 
Throughout the waking metropolis working people and school 
children searched their closets and drawers for infrequently 
needed jackets and sweaters to break the brisk off-shore 
breeze that rattled newly sealed windows and rustled the tops 
of majestic palms.1 Alone in a large rented loft building at 
1108 South Los Angeles Street, Rose Pesotta paced nervously 
back and forth, intermittently glancing at her watch and 
wondering if somehow something had gone wrong. Two hours 
earlier dozens of union committee members had vanished into 
the dark streets carrying thousands of printed leaf lets that 
bore the heading "Dressmakers' General Strike Declared 
Today!" Full of optimism, Pesotta had arrived the previous 
month aboard a TWA flight from Newark, New Jersey after 
President David Dubinsky of the International Ladies' Garment 
Workers' Union (ILGWU) had dispatched her on a mission to 
organize the largely Hispanic dressmakers of Los Angeles. 
Now the veteran labor leader wondered if local manufacturers 
were correct in their confident prediction that all her 
efforts in the west would be in vain. Before she could 
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reflect further, the silence outside was broken and within 
minutes hundreds of women poured into the hall.2 
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The month-16ng struggle that erupted that Thursday 
morning warrants the attention of historians for several 
reasons. The Los Angeles dressmakers' strike was part of the 
nationwide wave of walkouts that resulted from the passage of 
the NRA. Writers and researchers should therefore consider 
it when making detailed examinations of the period's labor 
phenomena.3 The strike also represented an important turning 
point for the Los Angeles ILGWU. The union failed to win a 
position of power and legitimacy comparable to that of 
eastern locals, reinforcing patterns that would persist for 
years. Garment manufacturers proved that they could preserve 
the open shop if they acted together and remained determined 
to thwart any attempts to bring change. The conflict 
demonstrated the weakness of the ILGWU and marked the end of 
the steady growth in membership that had begun in 1930. It 
became clear that the attempt to unionize the L.A. clothing 
industry would be a prolonged and difficult one. 
Contemporary newspapers represent an important source of 
information about the strike, but are potentially misleading. 
Editors gave varying explanations of the exact cause of the 
confrontation, depending on which side they supported. Rose 
Pesotta stated that the clothing workers walked off the job 
in order to achieve "union recognition, a 35-hour week, a 
guaranteed minimum wage ••• and [the end of] flagrant 
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disregard of state sanitary and safety regulations."4 The 
New York Times agreed that low wages were an important point 
of contention, ·citing that "girls received less than $5.00 a 
week, despite presidential re-employment agreements calling 
for a minimum of $15.00."5 In contrast, the Los Angeles 
Times, owned by labor opponent William Randolph Hearst, 
described the conflict as focussing exclusively upon union 
recognition and enforcement of the closed shop. The L.A. 
Times warned its readers that "New York organizers [wish] to 
compel open-shop industry to submit to union domination •. " 
The paper further asserted that there was "no question of 
wages, hours of employment, or working conditions," and that 
"generous offers of holiday pay and a 35 hour week" on the 
part of owners had been of no avail.6 
The Los Angeles Daily News, a pro-labor publication, 
generally depicted the strikers in a favorable light. The 
paper reported that a third of the six-thousand workers then 
employed in the central business district marched and 
displayed placards in front of the factories. While union 
members heckled shop managers and strikebreakers and sang 
defiant songs, the Daily News contended that "no disorder was 
created." The newspaper characterized ILGWU leaders as 
reasonable men and women attempting to acquire a majority of 
the dressmakers' signatures affirming union membership--
thereby gaining NRA recognition and a peaceful 
reconciliation.? 
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The Los Angeles Examiner adopted a neutral attitude, but 
included accounts of picket violence as well as the general 
information found in the Daily News column. Nathan Corn, a 
foreman at a local shop, claimed that after work he had been 
"mauled" by nine male strikers, one of whom was subsequently 
arrested for disturbing the peace. Later in the evening 
another group of protesting garment workers assaulted four 
newly-hired "scabs" in an alley behind the eight-hundred 
block of Broadway. The Examiner's editors carefully included 
both the union leadership's description of the "paralyzed 
garment district" and the manufacturer's assurances of 
"business as usual."8 
Predictably, Hearst's L.A. Times estimated that a mere 
1375 strikers (out of an estimated five thousand dressmakers) 
had joined the walkout and provided melodramatic accounts of 
the violent acts perp~trated by the "agitators." In an 
exclusive interview with Captain William Hynes of the Los 
Angeles police force's "Red Squad," the paper informed 
readers that pickets showered two carloads of nonunion 
workers with stones, and that "known Communists were 
involved." In response to such incidents, Police 
Commissioner Davis assigned Hynes and his squad to the strike 
area in order to protect employees and private property at 
the sixty shops under siege.9 
Except for the publications mentioned above, the Los 
Angeles garment district revolt received only limited 
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exposure in other newspapers. The California Eagle, the 
city's preeminent black paper, carried no coverage 
whatsoever-- no doubt because at the time few blacks worked 
within the clothing industry.10 The New York Times devoted 
one short article to the strike, which appeared to be 
supportive of the union interpretation of the conflict. 
Because ILGWU national headquarters was (and still is) 
located in Manhattan, it seems reasonable that President 
Dubinsky, Vice-president Israel Feinberg, and other 
influential members of the union elite may have had allies 
among Times staffers.11 The California Jewish Voice, a Los 
Angeles weekly printed in Yiddish, published an article that 
supported the ILGWU. The Voice called for an end to all 
v~olence and expressed hope for a swift and just 
resolution.12 
During the first week of the walkout, the recognition of 
an allied ILGWU cloakmakers' union intensified the resolve of 
picketing dressmakers and apparently swelled their ranks. 
Police Captain Hynes reported that several hundred additional 
women deserted the shops and took to the streets, bringing 
the protesters' total up to about 1700. The Associated 
Apparel Manufacturers (AAM} questioned this claim's accuracy 
and contended that "the strike is weakening, and women are 
returning to work."13 The correspondence between Pesotta and 
Dubinsky reflected an opposite appraisal of the situation. 
Although telegrams wired to the New York office contained 
41 
complaints of a money shortage, they described the production 
in local garment plants as at a virtual standstill, and 
boasted of great public support for the union women. Drawing 
a comparison to earlier organizational efforts in New York 
City, Pesotta predicted that the strike would end in a 
"historic" labor victory.14 
On the same day the optimistic union messages were being 
cabled to the national leadership in New York, Captain Hynes 
stated in a local press interview that the walkout was 
occurring at "the wrong time"-- at the end of the 
manufacturing season when laborers were traditionally in the 
least demand.15 Interestingly, President Dubinsky had 
expressed the same concern in a telegram dispatched to Rose 
Pesotta in late September, before the strike order was 
issued. Upon being notified that Los Angeles Local 65 
planned to go on the offensive shortly before the end of the 
season, Dubinsky immediately responded by advising against 
"an early stoppage," apparently fearing defeat. As 
subsequent communications demonstrate, Feinberg and Pesotta 
elected to ignore the president's advice, because they felt 
that any delay in combating recent industrial oppression 
might destroy the credibility of the city organization--
which was in serious need of initiation dues.16 As might be 
expected, the Los Angeles Times shared many of Officer Rynes' 
views concerning the ILGWU leaders' wisdom in staging a 
walkout. In a lengthy essay entitled "The Stupidity of 
Strikes," the editor opined: 
nine times out of ten a strike is the result of 
stupid, corrupt, and selfish activity on the part 
of the labor "leader" who himself will not suffer 
in the least because a strike is called. It is 
safe to say nine in ten strikes are entirely 
avoidable, not desired by a majority of the 
workers, result in no gain to the strikers compared 
with their loss in time and pay, and definitely 
lower the standard of living not only for every 
participant, but for the entire nation. A strike 
is like war-- it is the poorest possible method of 
settling a dispute.17 
The positioning of this editorial adjacent to the daily 
coverage of the garment industry conflict and its reference 
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to the issue of union majorities leaves little question as to 
the story's intended target. 
While members of the various elites debated the 
character and wisdom of the confrontation, in the garment 
district the level of violence intensified as the negotiation 
deadlock continued with no end in sight. Each morning, 
hundreds of picketers filled the sidewalks along Broadway 
between 7th and 9th Streets, often becoming embroiled in 
scuffles with strikebreakers and police. On Sunday officers 
arrested three protesters in what law enforcement officials 
described as a "brief free-for-all battle" between pickets 
and scabs.18 The husband of a supposed strikebreaker, Frank 
Baldy of North Hollywood, was "severely beaten" as he 
escorted his wife from a Broadway shop to their car. The 
attackers escaped arrest, and Baldy was treated for cuts and 
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bruises at an area hospital and released.19 An alternate 
version of the story denied that the couple was in any way 
involved with the strike, stating that they were 
misidentified by an unruly mob. Captain Hynes, commenting on 
the increased aggression in the streets, accused the union of 
making threats of violence and strengthened police security 
around twenty-two vulnerable clothing firms. Hynes hinted 
that his men would be "forced to get tough" if innocent 
citizens and private property were further threatened.20 
Fragile tempers on all sides were probably aggravated as 
the cool weather of the previous week gave way to 
temperatures reaching into the mid-nineties. In an article 
commenting on the sudden arrival of "Indian summer," the Los 
Angeles Times cautioned readers to protect themselves against 
the oppressive temperatures and humidity that had already 
caused several elderly residents to be hospitalized.21 The 
heat produced by hundreds of strikers crowded upon narrow 
sidewalks was probably intense, increasing the likelihood of 
violence. 
By mid-week the police made good on their promise to 
drop "the kidglove method of handling offensive strikers," 
and ninty-five additional officers equipped with tear-gas 
canisters joined existing forces. Soon violence ebbed, in 
part due to the increased presence of the Red Squad, and in 
part because Rose Pesotta and other organizers coached 
picketers on how to behave. With the appearance of the 
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"tear-gas bombs," Pesotta instructed her girls to do 
nothing-- "just let the tears run down [your] faces" if the 
gas should be used. When the police learned that the 
strikers knew how to respond to the gas, they declined to use 
it for the duration of the struggle.22 The arrival of a 
delegation of local ministers also served to temper the level 
of aggression, and on Thursday the 19th no injuries or 
arrests ensued. Several clergymen, including Dr. Roy L. 
Smith of the First Methodist Church, the Reverend Wesley G. 
Nicholson of Westwood Hills Congregational Church, and Dr. 
Allan Hunter of the First Unitarian Church, sought to 
investigate reports of police brutality. The Reverend Gross 
Alexander (denomination unidentified) quarrelled heatedly 
with police Lieutenant George Pfeiffer over the allegation 
that officers had beaten and intimidated striking women. 
Pfeiffer hotly denied the charge and threatened to arrest the 
pastor "if he created a disturbance." The only casualty of 
the day occurred when a patrolcar struck Frances Nunez at 853 
South Sante Street. A local hospital treated Nunez and 
released her with an injured foot.23 
Now that hundreds of workers had gone without an income 
for well over a week, the financial situation for many was 
fast becoming critical. To prevent the strikers from being 
forced back to work by hunger, the union provided food and 
emergency cash for scores of dressmakers and their families. 
Sympathetic merchants, especially those from the Hispanic 
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community, donated two hundred loaves of bread per day, as 
well as mass quantities of sugar, peanut butter, flour, rice, 
and coffee. Fresh supplies of lettuce, tomatoes, oranges, 
and cheese poured in as a Mexican radio station, El Eco de 
Mexico, broadcast the need for donations from its Tijuana 
studio. On the other hand, local utility companies--
supposedly in league with the AAM-- shut off the gas, 
electricity, and water of striking dressmakers as soon as 
payment became overdue. In response to this action, the 
local ILGWU office paid many impoverished picketers' bills 
and forced the resumption of basic services.24 The use of 
union monies in this way, as well as the regular practice of 
bailing arrested men and women out of prison, reduced Los 
Angeles Local 65 to a state of near-bankruptcy. 
Vice-President Feinberg wired Dubinsky in New York, 
requesting that he send funds immediately, because "victory 
now depends on your (Dubinsky's) support." Feinberg 
concluded his message with the plea, "remember your 
responsibility."25 Manufacturers also increased the pressure 
on union employees by issuing a leaf let saying that the 
entire industry would be shut down for two months unless 
everyone returned to work. Pesotta rejoined that owners 
could hardly afford such a luxury, considering their "rents 
and overhead." Similar intimidation had been applied in New 
York and elsewhere, but had always proved to be a bluff. It 
cost far less to pay union wages than to shut down entire 
f 
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businesses for even a short period of time.26 
The lull in the fighting ended on Saturday, October 21, 
and clashes on the sidewalks between union supporters and 
strikebeakers reached their greatest intensity since the 
beginning of the confrontation. That afternoon angry pickets 
surrounded and attacked a carload of scabs accompanied by 
police escort at Pico and Main. A woman brandishing a pair 
of shears slashed Chloe Weaver, and nine strikers assaulted 
Claudia Artley. They lacerated her face, neck, and shoulders 
and "ripped her clothes to shreds."27 Three men accosted a 
scab at 719 South Los Angeles Street where he was "thrown to 
the pavement and kicked," while pickets at a South Broadway 
shop "kicked and mauled" three strikebreakers. Police 
arrested seven union members on charges ranging from 
loitering and disturbing the peace to assault and battery, 
and in response to the day's violence, Captain Hynes 
"threatened to take absolute control of the strike." ILGWU 
Secretary Paul Berg reported on the same day that between 
three-thousand and four-thousand picketers were active and 
that the battle would continue until the employers 
capitulated. Captain Hynes estimated the true number of 
"agitators" as closer to 1750 and disputed the recent 
findings of the local investigating clergymen. A circular 
mailed to hundreds of area ministers by the Reverend Allan 
Hunter of Mount Hollywood Community Congregational Church 
concluded that the union justly demanded manufacturers' 
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compliance with NRA codes.28 
Although headlines indicated that a settlement might be 
close at hand, the AAM blocked hopes for an arbitrated peace 
by refusing to cooperate with NRA mediator Campbell 
MacColloch. The owners stated that they would submit to a 
negotiated settlement only if the union called off the strike 
first. An unidenfified union representative termed this 
proposal "the old ruse," and declared: 
They've been stalling us off for weeks and weeks. 
They've broken faith repeatedly. They don't want 
to recognize our union because they know we will 
police the industry and force NRA members to live 
up to the code instead of allowing chiselers to 
hire women 60 hours a week and pay them $3 or $4 
for the week's hire. 
Fearing a renewal of the violence that had abruptly ended 
after MacColloch called his meeting the day before, Hynes 
announced that he planned to reinforce police ranks and 
maintain order.29 
Newspaper headlines reported the arrest of former 
undercover policeman Jack Morrison on Thursday, October 26, 
for bribery and conspiracy. Morrison approached Sergeant 
R.F. Marburg of the metropolitan police and offered him $800 
for his assistance in a plot to break the union. The 
sergeant learned that he and his men would be well rewarded 
if they would "use clubs and beat up and arrest the 
strikers." A transfer of cash occurred on the following 
morning at a hotel near 8th and Main, at which time Marburg 
received "partial-payment"-- the balance of the money to be 
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paid when the strike concluded. Unfortunately for Morrison, 
Marburg informed his superior officer (Captain C.B. Horrell) 
between the meetings, and plainclothes detectives witnessed 
the exchange and made the arrest.30 The following day 
officials announced to the press that J.M. Goldson, a dress 
manufacturer who owned a shop at 711 South Los Angeles 
Street, had apparently hired Jack Morrison as his 
representative in a conspiracy to "buy" Los Angeles 
policemen. While officers took Goldson into custody and the 
district attorney filed criminal charges for the incidentj 
police never confirmed the involvement of other employers.31 
Los Angeles Times coverage predictably played down the 
bribery scandal and emphasized continuing union violence 
instead. The editors praised the decision of police to 
engage in wholesale arrests in an effort to "halt brawls." 
Deputy City Attorney Maines instructed Captain Hynes to 
"bring them in by the wagon load and we'll issue charges 
against them and we'll see if this disorder can't be 
stopped." Union members attacked four more women in street 
scuffles, bringing the total "to nearly seventy" by the 
Hearst paper's estimate.32 
By the final week of October, several developments 
indicated that the strike might soon be ended. At least two 
employers agreed to union demands and signed wage agreements 
with the ILGWU. Newspapers quoted David Haister, the owner 
of a cutting and pressing operation at 850 South Broadway, as 
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saying that ILGWU recognition was "the only way to cooperate 
100 percent with the president's (FDR) recovery program." 
Haister further asserted that "the recovery program is doomed 
unless workers are given a decent wage. I believe that in 
signing the agreement I am complying with the program."33 
Employers began to indicate a willingness to negotiate and 
NRA representative Campbell MacColloch suggested three 
individuals as potential arbitrators. The proposed committee 
would include Rabbi Lsrael Isaacson of the Congregation 
Israel Synagogue, Mabel Socha, president of the Los Angeles 
Park Board, and Dr. J.L. Leonard, professor of economics at 
the University of Southern California. After ~ meeting of 
the Chamber of Commerce, employers declared that they would 
agree to arbitration with the strike still in effect, 
provided that union members curb the violence in the street. 
ILGWU Secretary Paul Berg responded by saying that law 
enforcement was the job of the police.34 
The continuing battle to define the purpose of the 
strike came into clear focus during the waning days of 
October. On the 27th, the Los Angeles Times printed an 
editorial explaining a pro-employer interpretation of the 
union's motives: 
Even if the strikers had a real grievance, tactics 
of this sort [violence] could not be tolerated. 
But they have not even this excuse. The strikers 
themselves emphasize that this is not a strike over 
wages, hours, or working conditions, but only for 
the closed shop, which means for the principle that 
every worker in the garment industry must pay 
tribute to some labor leader to hold his job. 
The article went on to criticize city authorities for not 
"cracking down" early enough to prevent "the assaults, the 
riots, and the obstruction of sidewalks that have 
characterized this disturbance."35 
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Three days later the .Illustrated Daily News printed a 
captioned photograph entitled "Girl Workers Air Grievances." 
Despite the Times' definition of low wages as a non-issue, 
seventy-two garment workers filed complaints at the offices 
of the State Industrial Welfare Commission against nine Los 
Angeles firms. The Daily News pictured one young woman, 
Peggy Henry, displaying a time card indicating that she had 
labored thirty-two hours only to receive 90 cents.36 The 
local ILGWU newsletter, the Organizer, made it equally clear 
that wage-rates were a central issue to both the picketers 
and the union. Released in both Spanish and English, the 
letter attacked the payment of "slave wages" and told 
laborers that "conditions in the Los Angeles dress industry 
are the worst in the country."37 
Although November promised to usher in a speedy strike 
settlement, it also arrived on the heels of the mass arrests 
long threatened by·City Hall· and police spokesmen. Twice on 
October 31 and again on November 1, officers loaded the paddy 
wagons-- called "Black Marias"-- with union women accused of 
violating clauses of the city's public protest ordinance.38 
Police seized fourteen in the eight hundred block of South 
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Broadway during the peak of afternoon shopping and took them 
to the Lincoln Heights Jail. There the strikers refused bail 
and spent the night in prison singing labor songs that 
deprived the jail's matron of her accustomed rest. According 
to Pesotta, by this late stage in the conflict some policemen 
began to demonstrate union sympathies. Law officials had 
received the scorn of the press for their supposed leniency, 
which may in part account for this change of heart. 
Lieutenant George Pfeiffer, the man who had earlier 
threatened the investigating pastor with arrest, was one such 
officer. Upon witnessing a crowd of strikers yelling "scab" 
at arriving carloads of strikebreakers, Pfeiffer encouraged 
the demonstrators. He "lifted his arms like an orchestra 
conductor" and shouted "now girls, all together!" On cue, 
the line of women roared at their opponents.39 
The newly formed NRA mediation board met on November 2 
to hear the testimony of both sides in an effort to unravel 
the tangle of rhetoric and determine which-- if either-- side 
was right. Charles J. Katz, the AAM attorney, repeated the 
contention that "there has been no clash between employers 
and employees on wages, hours and working conditions." Katz 
went on to claim that "something deeper and more sinister" 
was occurring-- "workers trying to force the union upon the 
employers." Vice-President Feinberg challenged Katz by 
observing that sweatshops "can be found in the finest factory 
building in Los Angeles when workers' weekly pay envelope 
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contains only $5 or $6." Several dressmakers provided 
testimony regarding blacklisting within the clothing industry 
and quoted one employer as saying, "To hell with the Blue 
Eagle! I'm running my own shop and if you don't like it you 
can get out." The conference ended with AAM Secretary Arthur 
Booth pledging that his organization would discuss "wages, 
hours, and other vital matters."40 
The following day, the cross-examination of witnesses 
continued before the arbitration board, with AAM lawyer 
Charles Katz again going on the offensive. He asserted that 
1339 employees in forty-two factories were not ILGWU members 
and that within those firms they represented a majority. 
Surely such "men" should not be forced to accept union 
"domination!" Then Feinberg and his associates presented six 
witnesses who swore that their bosses routinely made them 
stay at work without pay until assigned a task. A number of 
women told the committee that in some shops seamstresses did 
not know their wage-rate for piecework until payday 
arrived.41 
Saturday, November 4, marked the final meeting of the 
arbitration board and the official end of the twenty-four day 
stand-off. Employers and ILGWU spokemen argued in session 
until 11 p.m., at which time the entire assembly retired to 
City Hall to hear the NRA Committee's verdict. The committee 
presented the union with an "order" that included the 
following: 
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The present strike in the garment industry is to be 
called off and the status quo existing prior to 
October 12,· 1933 restored. The International 
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, on behalf of its 
members, shall in the first instance take up all 
complaints with the employers and/or the employers 
representatives and in the event of a dispute or 
disagreement the dispute shall be referred to this 
board ••. 42 
Pesotta, Feinberg, and other ILGWU leaders were 
dissatisfied. Without any definite arrangements for 
enforcement the owners might easily flout all their 
commitments and return to stalling tactics or worse.43 Rose 
Pesotta encouraged union members to respect the resolution, 
because a legal order would be nigh impossible to fight, and 
a system for airing grievances-- whatever its deficiencies--
had been established.44 Vice-President Feinberg, in 
contrast, cabled David Dubinsky informing him that because 
the manufacturers were already betraying their promises, the 
"absolutely disgusted" union membership must continue its 
strike. Within two days, however, the vice-president 
reversed himself and stated that the "dull condition" of the 
industry made acceptance of the settlement terms imperative. 
In the final analysis, Feinberg considered the struggle 
victorious because the union secured recognition and could 
now legally engage in collective bargaining. The Mexican 
clothing workers could claim a moral victory, because they 
had stood up to American bosses and maintained their personal 
dignity-- even at the price of going to jail.45 
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In examining the conflicting assertions made by the 
owners and the ILGWU concerning the strike's basic intent, it 
is clear that the union presented a more convincing case. 
Nearly all other sources refuted AAM claims that "wages, 
hours, and working conditions" were not relevant to the 
strike, including the statement made by AAM Sec~etary Arthur 
Booth referring to these issues as "vital matters." 
Confidential correspondence between union leaders, an 
incisive reflection of their real thoughts, repeat the 
essential facts printed in ILGWU public statements about 
wages and working conditions.46 
The results of the strike, as Pesotta, Feinberg, and 
other ILGWU chiefs admitted, were mixed. The return to the 
status quo of October 12 meant that the picketers received no 
pay increases, reduction in hours, or improvement in working 
conditions. Workers did emerge from their ordeal "united in 
spirit" and represented by a legally recognized union where 
"suspicion and seclusiveness" had reigned before.47 
Several factors may be cited to explain the union's 
partial failure. First, the workers resisted a well financed 
foe that had the police on its side. The ILGWU, in contrast, 
proved unwilling or unable to send the resources necessary to 
continue a work stoppage indefinitely. Second, with the 
garment season almost over, the employers' need of laborers 
reached a seasonal low. Hence, the ILGWU lacked the muscle 
that powers a strike. Third, both the manufacturers' and the 
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union's tally of the strikers revealed that a majority failed 
to walk off the job. For whatever reason, the ILGWU failed 
to convince enough workers to gamble on the results of a 
conflict, and the total industrial paralysis that would have 
brought a better agreement never materialized. The hiring of 
scabs to take the. place of those who did join the picket line 
intensified this problem. Finally, Los Angeles lacked the 
union tradition existing in New York City and other eastern 
centers. It was .to be expected that the going would be tough 
until the ILGWU became a more accepted part of the local shop 
system. 
How economically justified was the strike? Statistics 
compiled by the United States Department of Commerce revealed 
that even reported incomes, in all likelihood superior to 
those obtained in illegal operations, often fell below the 
fifteen dollar minimum set by the NRA.48 At the same time, 
the net profits of factory owners continued to climb despite 
the arrival of the depression in 1929. In the state of 
California, one hundred and fifty-three percent more garment 
workers were hired in 1933 than in 1927, reflecting a growth 
rate well in excess of that experienced in York City.49 
Manufacturers' accusations that union organizers acted 
only in their own self-interest appear unfounded in light of 
the large quantities of cash freely distributed to 
financially distressed households and arrested picketers in 
need of bail money.SO The treasury records of Los Angeles 
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Local 65 reported the collection of only $570 in dues between 
April 1, 1932 and April 30, 1934. The national office in New 
York contributed a far greater amount of money to the Los 
Angeles area than the membership had to pay.51 
The dressmakers' strike left the ILGWU with the 
potential to achieve its goals, depending upon the actions of 
the leadership and future economic developments. In the 
years that followed, had union chiefs worked together and 
acquired sufficient financial resources, they might have 
mounted a successful organizing campaign. Had the union 
spent generous sums on literature and conspicuous projects, 
it might have impressed workers with its dynamism. If a 
majority of area garment workers had lent their support to a 
dynamic ILGWU, perhaps striking would have ended the open 
shop. But advances could only be made if the economy 
remained stable and the demand for labor high. The next 
chapter will examine how the Los Angeles ILGWU's potential 
remained unrealized throughout the 1930's and up to the 
United States's entry into World War Two. 
57 
Notes 
1 Los Angeles Times, 12 October 1933. 
2 Rose Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters (New York: Dodd, 
Mead, and Company, 1944), 38. 
3 David A. Shannon, Between the Wars: America, 
1919-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979), 183-84. 
4 Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 31. 
5 New York Times, 13 October 1933. 
6 Los Angeles Times, 13 October 1933. 
7 Los Angeles Illustrated Daily News, 13 October 1933. 
8 Los Angeles Examiner, 13 October 1933. 
9 Los Angeles Times, 14 October 1933. The hostility 
of the times was asserted in the ILGWU magazine Justice on 1 
October 1933, p. 8. 
10 California Eagle (Los Angeles), 1 October-25 
November 1933. By 1950, with the growth of the sports wear 
industry, blacks would constitute a sizable percentage of 
L.A. needle workers. 
11 New York Times, 13 October 1933 
12 California Jewish Voice (Los Angeles), 26 October 
1933. 
13 Los Angeles Examiner, 14 October 1933. 
14 Rose Pesotta to David Dubinsky, Dubinsky 
Correspondence, Cornell University Labor Management 
Documentation Center, Ithaca, New York. Hereafter the Labor 
Management Documentation Center will be cited (LMD). 
15 Pesotta to Dubinsky, 15 October 1933, (LMD). 
16 Israel Feinberg to David Dubinsky, 25 September 
1933, (LMD). 
17 Los Angeles Times, 17 October 1933. 
18 Los Angeles Examiner, 17 October 1933. 
58 
19 Los Angeles Illustrated Daily New.§, 17 October 1933. 
20 Los Angeles Times, 17 October 1933. 
21 Los Angeles Times, 18 October 1933. 
22 Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 50. 
23 Los Angeles Examiner, 19 October 1933. 
24 Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters,. 43. 
25 Feinberg to Dubinsky, 29 October 1933, (LMD). 
26 Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 43. 
27 Los Angeles Illustrated Daily News, 21 October 1933. 
28 Los Angeles Examiner, 21 October 1933. 
29 Los Angeles Illustrated Daily News, 24 October 1933. 
30 Ibid., 26 October 1933. 
31 Ibid., 27 October 1933. 
32 Los Angeles ~imes, 26 October 1933. The writer 
counted less than twenty after combining other sources. 
33 Los Angeles Illustrated Daily News, 26 October 1933. 
34 Los Angeles Examiner, 27 October 1933. 
35 Los Angeles Times, 27 October 1933. 
36 Los Angeles Illustrated Daily News, 31 October 1933. 
37 The Organizer, undated (late Sptember 1933) 
38 Los Angeles Illustrated Daily News, 1 November 1933 
39 Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 51-52. 
40 Los Angeles Illustrated Daily News, 2 November 1933. 
The Blue Eagle was the symbol of the NRA. 
41 Los Angeles Times, 3 November 1933. 
42 Los Angeles Illustrated Daily News, 7 November 1933. 
43 Pesotta, Bread :Upon the Waters, 54-55. 
44 Ibid., 57. 
45 Feinberg to Dubinsky, 20 November 1933, (LMD). 
46 David Dubinsky Correspondence, September 1933-June 
1934, (LMD). 
47 Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 340-41. 
48 U.S. Department of Commerce, Census of 
Manufacturing, (Washington Printing Office, 
1914,1923,1930,1933.) 
49 Paul Berg to David Dubinsky, 20 November 1933, 
(LMD). 
50 Los Angeles Times, 18 October 1933. The AAM 
compared union leaders to carpetbaggers. 
51 22nd ILGWU Convention, Reports and Proceedings, 
Spring 1934. 
52 Los Angeles Citizen, 14 October 1933. 
59 
CHAPTER IV 
FRUSTRATION: 1934-1941 
After the dressmakers' strike was settled, the Los 
Angeles ILGWU met with frustration for the remainder of the 
New Deal era. Union objectives of attaining industry wide 
recognition, increased wages, improved working conditions, 
and the closed shop remained unrealized in a significant 
portion of the clothing industry. This failure was in large 
part the result of disunity among union leaders already 
encumbered by the stubborn resistance of regional 
manufacturers. Because the efforts of a decade yielded only 
modest gains, ILGWU publications tended to limit coverage 
about Southern California. Frequently, the editors of 
Justice (the ILGWU bi-monthly magazine) failed to report on 
how the Los Angeles garment workers were faring for several 
months at a time, only to break their silence with a short 
article encouraging continued hope and announcing the latest 
social event designed to maintain morale. The union's 
chronicle of its own progress, ILGWU News-History, was 
completely mute about Los Angeles in the four installments 
that appeared between 1933 and 1945. After the conclusion of 
the 1933 walkouts, the union virtually ceased to exist as far 
as the city press was concerned. Only an AFL-affiliated 
labor weekly, the Citizen, afforded the ladies' garment 
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workers frequent local publicity (despite the union's 
two-year association with the CIO), and the Citizen also 
lapsed into occasional silence. This reduction in 
contemporary coverage in part explains why no comprehensive 
history has focussed upon the Los Angeles ILGWU after the 
brief drama of the dressmakers' revolt. The following pages 
will, therefore, examine and analyze this chapter of the 
union's history prior to the outbreak of the Second World 
War. 
By the final weeks of 1933, the Los Angeles locals faced 
a grave situation. Work within the garment district 
completely halted awaiting the beginning of the spring 
season, and former strikers found themselves without an 
income despite the November settlement. Repeatedly, Pesotta 
implored Dubinsky to wire money because the new locals 
required eight hundred dollars a month merely to cover 
payroll, rents, and other necessities-- and as yet members 
could pay no dues. Sensing the power of their position, many 
employers refused to honor their promises to rehire union 
members and openly pledged to defy NRA pay scales.1 
Confronted with news of the grim situation, Dubinsky reminded 
the Los Angeles leadership of his earlier advice against 
striking and demanded that they economize. The walkout had 
been far too expensive, he asserted, and costly enterprises 
such as the printing of the Organizer should be terminated. 
Pesotta received a blunt reprimand for failing to keep the 
New York office sufficiently informed, and Dubinsky curtly 
denied her plea that he visit Los Angeles.2 
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That there were no significant ILGWU strikes in Los 
Angeles during the next two years resulted from several 
factors. Declining production brought on by hard times 
reduced union dues as well as the number of jobs and provided 
the owners with a large pool of potential strikebreakers. 
These conditions prompted the Executive Board to adopt a 
defensive policy of waiting, because to do otherwise would be 
disastrous. No benefits would be available for strikers if a 
stoppage was called, and blacklisting might prevent militant 
workers from ever rejoining the garment trades. The 
leadership that had organized the 1933 campaigns dispersed to 
other locales, with Pesotta departing to San Francisco and 
Feinberg to Portland, Seattle, and other west coast cities 
within his jurisdiction. Therefore, Bill Busick, Ivan 
Lutsky, and other ILGWU officers who remained behind faced 
the task of restoring stability and momentum as best they 
could.3 
An organizing drive consumed the first half of 1934, but 
achieved only partial success. The International founded a 
new dressmakers' organization, Local 97, and made yet another 
effort to enroll all seven thousand dress workers in the 
union.4 Opinions diverge on the reasons behind the slow rate 
of growth, but membership rolls reveal an indisputable 
reality. A year after the organizing effort began, the ILGWU 
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reported only 2,460 members in Los Angeles. Of these, only 
1,100 were employed in the silk, wool, and cotton dress 
industries, with the remainder working in cloak, sportswear, 
and undergarment shops.5 Communist obstruction tactics 
created one obstacle, as elements of the disbanded Needle 
Trades Industrial Union attempted to "bore from within." The 
Communists distributed propaganda that attacked the 
established leadership, filibustered committee meetings, and 
cited the current avoidance of striking as proof of the 
leadership's cowardice. Fear of being added to the 
blacklist-- the manufacturers' illegal directory of people 
systematically denied employment-- probably hindered 
recruiting efforts, as did many local employees' mistrust of 
eastern outsiders.6 Nevertheless, the renewal of contracts 
with local dress manufacturers allowed the ILGWU to claim 
1934 as a year of victory. 
Conferences held between union representatives and 
owners produced a two-year covenant that was to be valid 
until July 1, 1936. As its major concession, the ILGWU 
agreed to yield its power to strike, and promised to obey the 
rulings of the "impartial" arbitration board that had 
tendered the disappointing strike settlement of the previous 
November. Employers pledged to recognize the union's 
authority to speak for its members, agreed to pay NRA wages, 
and promised to uphold a seven-hour day and a five-day week. 
Both parties combined to help finance group death and 
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disability insurance, and union negotiators believed that the 
open shop would soon be abandoned.7 Although Dubinsky 
joined Los Angeles banqueters in celebrating their 
arbitration victory, the negative aspects of the agreement 
are clear.8 In exchange for the employers' concessions--
which in large part amounted to their agreement to obey 
existing labor laws-- the ILGWU openly forsook its most 
powerful weapon, the ability to call a strike. Communist 
characterizations of union chiefs as collaborators appeared 
confirmed, and the contract still allowed the continued 
exploitation of the non-union majority, which employers could 
easily intimidate into remaining outside the ladies' garment 
locals. For many manufacturers, the agreement seemed a cheap 
method of silencing the troublemakers while maintaining an 
open shop. Owners and managers routinely broke the terms of 
union contracts and believed their actions vindicated by the 
Schechter decision which declared the NRA to be 
unconstitutional in 1935. Here the situation stood until the 
pact's expiration in mid-1936, at which time both parties 
felt sufficiently strengthened to resume a struggle 
temporarily deferred, but not decided.9 
The ILGWU began consolidating its strength during the 
weeks prior to the July contract termination date by renewing 
efforts to organize non-union dressmakers and by waging 
several minor confrontations with pajama and underwear 
manufacturers. The General Executive Board met in Los 
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Angeles for the first time and granted its approval to plans 
for a walkout. Local leaders led by Vice-President Feinberg 
insisted upon the closed shop in all dressmaking firms and 
opened negotiations with owners in hopes of avoiding a 
clash.10 When these talks reached an impasse, union chiefs 
gave the order and some three thousand dressmakers abandoned 
the shops and began picketing.11 
Shortly after the strike was called, conditions began to 
resemble those of the great dressmakers' strike of 1933. 
Police Captain William Hynes arrived with his infamous Red 
Squad, and incidents of violence erupted as crowds of pickets 
collided with strikebreaking workers and police escorts. At 
the intersection of Seventh and Flower Streets, a large 
scuff le broke out, after which police arrested and 
interrogated Bernard Hyman, a union member accused of 
attacking strikebreakers. When news of the arrest became 
public, ILGWU organizer Lutsky accused the manufacturers of 
conspiring with police to provoke the incident. Lutsky 
claimed that the owners hoped to incite brawls and then use 
the violence as a pretext for gaining a court injunction to 
prevent picketing. If such was the case, the scheme soon 
went awry when twenty-five witnesses testified that Hyman was 
innocent of wrongdoing and had actually attempted to calm the 
uneasy crowd before the arrival of Hynes's men.12 A later 
investigation by the U.S. Senate Committee on Education and 
Labor confirmed suspicions of police corruption by 
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discovering that during this period the Merchants and 
Manufacturers' Association paid Hynes $769 for police lunches 
and dinners. The Association also expended in excess of a 
thousand dollars for the hiring of off-duty cops and "special 
detectives," whose sole responsibility was to defeat the 
upstart clothing workers.13 Despite this substantial outlay 
of capital, within a few days a majority of the owners 
decided to avoid a costly repetition of the 1933 walkout and 
to accept a settlement with their labor foes. 
After four days of crowded sidewalks and idle machines, 
the owners of fifty-six shops employing some 2600 workers 
signed contracts with ILGWU representatives. The agreements 
established minimum weekly wages of twenty-eight dollars for 
women and thirty-five dollars for men and enacted a 
thirty-five hour week. The manufacturers agreed to enforce 
the closed shop by November 1, 1936, with the understanding 
that the union would proceed to organize the remainder of the 
city's dress trade. Although some stubborn entrepreneurs 
continued their resistance, thus prompting four hundred women 
to maintain picket lines, ninety percent of the dress 
manufacturers pledged to cooperate. La Opinion, a major 
Spanish language newspaper in Los Angeles, ran the front-page 
headline "Triumph at Last for the Clothing Workers," and to 
most observers this seemed to be the case.14 Events would 
demonstrate, however, that the open shop was well entrenched 
in a city famous for its sunshine, movie stars, and defiance 
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of organized labor. 
Several factors served to undermine the 1936 campaign. 
Throughout the remainder of the year, the intransigent 
minority of open-shop dress manufacturers held its ground, 
supported by the Southern California Garment Manufacturers' 
Association.15 The Los Angeles Times, the Illustrated Daily 
News, and other local newspapers ignored most minor strikes 
and printed hostil~ stories about labor "terrorism" 
purportedly inspired by radical outsiders. These editorial 
practices discouraged the rise of public support that might 
have translated into political action. Because of the 
availability of cheap labor in the city, which was steadily 
augmented by the arrival of thousands of Dust Bowl refugees, 
a determined employer usually found ample replacements for 
"disloyal" workers. Late in November, 1936, weeks after the 
deadline for the initiation of the closed shop, a committee 
of dressmakers visited the city office of the State Division 
of Industrial Welfare. This delegation charged that 
employers falsified. time cards, paying some women as little 
as three dollars a week.16 Unless the ILGWU could make good 
on its promise to unionize the entire industry, the 
unorganized shops would out-sell competitors with cheaply 
produced merchandise. The result might be a general 
repudiation of the new contracts. 
After the holidays, Feinberg declared that he found 
"Labor, organized as well as unorganized, ready as never 
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before in its history to demand a greater share in the 
returning prosperity of the nation."17 Despite this 
assessment, the·Ladies' Garment Workers did not enjoy great 
victories during the new year. In response to a deepening 
local recession, a decline in overall output marked the Los 
Angeles garment manufacturing season during 1937. Although 
the General Executive Board pledged to set aside $500,000 for 
a new national organization campaign, there is little 
evidence that Los Angeles benefited from the fund.18 When 
the ILGWU held its yearly election of officers in February, 
less than two thousand cutters, pressers, dressmakers,and 
cloakmakers cast votes. Such a turnout suggests either 
worker apathy or an overall absence of union growth during 
the previous four years.19 
The formation of a wealthy opposition group named 
Southern Californians, Incorporated undermined the effort to 
renew the organizing drive in the dress shops. A creation of 
the Los Angeles Merchants and Manufacturers Association and 
the Chamber of Commerce, the Southern Californians spent 
thousands of dollars on anti-labor propaganda and lobbied for 
the passage of a city ordinance to outlaw picketing. The 
defeat of this scheme absorbed much of the ILGWU's energy and 
attention, thereby reducing the amount of resources allocated 
to the fight for reforms.20 After weeks of pleading their 
case to the city fathers, union lawyers and spokesman 
convinced only two councilmen to cast dissenting votes. Only 
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Mayor Frank L. Shaw's bold veto prevented the passage of the 
law, which had· already received the affirmative vote of the 
City Council.21 
The International achieved several notable successes 
that gave credibility to Feinberg's claim that the Los 
Angeles locals had made "steady advances in the struggle of 
our workers." Clearly the most significant achievement was 
the second renewal of the cloakmakers' contract that 
arbitrators first drafted back in 1933. Instead of merely 
maintaining the status quo, the cloakmakers won a general ten 
percent wage increase and the reduction of the current 
35-hour week to 32.5 hours (the same as in New York) .22 
Besides this reassertion of cloakmaker clout, the union waged 
several minor strikes that, despite their inconclusiveness, 
rallied the spirits of members. One involved the Darling 
Dress Shops at Ninth and Los Angeles, where two hundred women 
picketed for weeks, suffering repeated physical assaults by 
police. The situation gained the attention of Mayor Shaw 
after two women required hospitalization, and a "full 
investigation" of police behavior followed.23 
More problematic was a conflict at the Vo'gel Brothers' 
Coat Factory, an "open shop fortress" enclosed by barbed-wire 
and guards, where 160 women struck for higher wages and union 
recognition. The firm had fled to the suburbs to escap~ 
unionization, and its owners boasted about their business's 
"immunity" as the only unorganized coat shop on the coast. 
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The ILGWU strike halted production and provided dramatic 
evidence of union militancy but failed to break the will of 
the management.24 The following year the Ladies' Garment 
Workers challenged the Vogel brothers again, this time before 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) , after the owners 
decided to form a company union. The ensuing investigation 
and proceedings consumed many months until finally, in 1940, 
a decision was handed down. Although early findings by a 
trial examiner supported the ILGWU's position, the Board's 
final ruling dealt the union a stinging defeat. The NLRB 
recognized the legitimacy of the company union, the 
Independent Garment Workers' Union, and dismissed the 
complaint against the Vogel organization.25 In late 1937, 
without knowing that the struggle against Ben, Joseph, and 
Leo Vogel had just begun, a weary Feinberg acknowledged that 
"our unions on the Pacific Coast still have quite a world to 
conquer before they may call their task complete."26 As the 
manufacturing trio would reveal, the ILGWU had no monopoly on 
stubbornness and tenacity. 
A decade later Pesotta observed that during this period 
"the ILGWU's local leadership had failed its members 
miserably." The organization suffered from internal 
squabbling and failed to win the loyalty of newcomers to the 
trades. Gradually the dress industry declined in overall 
importance as manufacturers changed over to the production of 
sportswear-- which was not covered by union contracts. 
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Several dress locals within the city folded, until by the end 
of the decade only Cotton Dress Local 266 remained.27 
Reviving union activities within the dressmaking industry 
became an important priority. The ILGWU also turned its 
attention to the growing sportswear trades that appeared to 
represent the future of the region's clothing business. 
In the midst of mass unemployment among dress and 
coatmakers during a spring season "slow in developing," the 
ILGWU fought to maintain its members' morale in 1938. 
Organizers won a settlement with the Chic Lingerie Compa~y, 
the largest producer of its kind in the city, prompting 
Feinberg to assert that "our position on the West Coast has 
not been weakened even by the recession."28 Nevertheless, 
the shut-down of most of the garment district forced leaders 
to delay confronting their enemies. Instead, the union 
sponsored mandolin, choir, and "physical culture" classes, as 
well as a baseball team and a lecture series. Bill Busick, 
Pesotta's former lieutenant during the 1933 dressmakers' 
strike, found himself directing a "series of round table 
discussions for [union council] chairladies in the dress 
industry."29 Morris G. Axelrod, chairman of L.A. Cutters' 
Local 84, appealed for financial assistance to the unemployed 
and announced plans to cooperate with a federal theater 
project.30 The ILGWU Broadway hit "Pins and Needles" 
provided needed diversion for the city's beleaguered clothing 
workers, performing to sellout crowds with seats selling for 
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as high as $5.50.31 
Feinberg summed up conditions that autumn in an article 
entitled "Riding the Gale in West Coast Garment Trades." 
Moderate unemployment existed in area cloak shops, but 
difficulties in the dress establishments were "much more 
pronounced." The open shop persisted at many firms, and 
Feinberg described a large number of companies as "operating 
on a shoe string." Subsequent to the abolition of the NRA, 
many workers toiled more than forty-four hours a week and 
received three to five dollars in return.32 For these 
employees, nothing had changed since 1933. 
Because of the ILGWU's failure to reform these 
conditions, the dress manufacturers under contract refused to 
renew their agreement when the expiration date arrived the 
following July. They complained that the open shop still 
prevailed in the wool and silk dress trades and that cheaper 
non-union merchandise seriously eroded profits. Such 
underselling led to inevitable bankruptcy.33 
The International's response was to call a meeting of 
dressmakers and ask their permission to order a walkout. 
Work ceased in thirty-five factories at 2:30 p.m. on June 22, 
1939 to give all employees the chance to vote. With only a 
week until the old contract's termination, the members agreed 
to strike.34 Employers requested a conference to negotiate a 
settlement, and both sides accepted a temporary pact lasting 
until August. Experienced veterans of earlier 
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confrontations, neither party wished to gamble on an 
expensive work stoppage that might cause financial disaster 
for everyone involved.35 Officials announced a new 
three-year contract to 1,100 dressmakers who crowded into the 
Labor Temple auditorium on 11 August. Feinberg informed the 
assembled men and women that the new agreement included one 
and one-quarter time pay for over-time and asked for their 
ratification. The crowd enthusiastically gave its assent and 
pledged to cooperate to gain "union conditions among 
unorganized shops."36 
During the 1939 season, the ILGWU enjoyed one notable 
victory in its continued effort to end the reign of the open 
shop among Los Angeles clothing manufacturers. The union 
waged a marathon eleven-week strike against the David Shann 
sportswear shop in protest over low wages and "sweatshop 
conditions." Police arrested five strikers on assault 
charges, which the defendants appealed after a stay at 
Lincoln Heights Jail. Afterwards, the proprietors themselves 
encountered the weight of the justice system, facing criminal 
charges for breaking State minimum-wage regulations and for 
failing to produce financial records.37 The next month the 
Shann firm capitulated and signed a contract granting sole 
bargaining power to the ILGWU, a forty hour week, an eighteen 
dollar weekly minimum, and paid holidays. For the twenty 
women who had paced the sidewalk for seventy days, suddenly a 
"new deal" arrived.38 But thousands of others in non-union 
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shops toiled on with no changes in the foreseeable future. 
In the waning days of the 1930's, the ILGWU president 
reorganized the west coast locals, firing or reassigning 
almost every office holder. Dubinsky recalled Feinberg, the 
Vice-president in charge of the Pacific Coast, for service on 
the Joint Cloak and Dress Board in his native New York--
permanently removing him from this story.39 Louis Levy, a 
middle-aged New Yorker who suffered from poor health, assumed 
the west coast leadership and took up his new duties from a 
sickbed. Dubinsky fired Lutsky, manager of the Los Angeles 
Cloak and Dress Board, because of his Communist connections. 
A former party member himself, Lutsky allegedly awarded key 
positions to "Reds" who "did the union much harm." The 
Communists within the ILGWU had waged a bitter struggle with 
their opponents during the previous decade, and Lutsky's 
firing marked their definitive defeat. His replacement was 
George Wishnak, a veteran labor leader from New York.40 
Organizer Bill Busick became embroiled in a scandal involving 
an agreement he had negotiated with Hollywood Maxwell 
Lingerie the year before. An investigation by the Regional 
Labor Board revealed that Busick had sabotaged ILGWU 
unionization efforts in return for cash and had supported 
NLRB sponsored elections that would establish a company union 
at Hollywood Maxwell. In the meantime Busick had left ·the 
Ladies' Garment Workers for a position with Furniture 
Workers' Local 1561. When the Labor Board's findings became 
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public, Busick lost his new job despite denials of wrongdoing 
and moved to Las Vegas.41 Then on the first day of the new 
year, Justice announced the imminent return of Rose Pesotta 
to Los Angeles after a six-year absence from the city.42 
With sweeping changes in the west coast leadership came 
announcements of a new campaign to combat the continuing 
problems that had frustrated the former labor chiefs. A 
January article in Justice admitted that sixty percent of Los 
Angeles dressmakers and all of the sportswear workers 
remained unorganized. Even within the cloak trade, which had 
enjoyed something approaching a closed shop since 1933, 
contract jobbers remained without collective bargaining.43 
On January 15, 1940, Pesotta initiated the first move in the 
new offensive by picketing a fashion show that was marketing 
non-union merchandise. ILGWU women in evening clothes 
blocked the sidewalks in front of the Biltmore Hotel, 
capturing more attention than the review inside and prompting 
the management to summon police.44 In a newspaper article 
the following day, the pageant director offered Pesotta his 
grudging congratulations, saying, "That was a clever stunt. 
You stole the show."45 
More serious union resistance began in early February, 
when five hundred machine operators, cutters, finishers, and 
pressers walked off the job. Among the firms affected were 
Hamburger Apparel, the L. Marcus Company, Barry-Newburg 
Apparel, and Merritt Cloaks-- all of which capitulated and 
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agreed to union wage rates and a 35-hour week. Cutters and 
pressers at the Twentieth Century Company joined the general 
strike, as did Carolina Frocks and the Hollywood Novelty 
Fashions shop. As members of the Merchants and 
Manufacturers' Association, the owners at Twentieth Century 
vowed continued resistance, but the latter firms quickly 
agreed to sign union contracts. A confident Pesotta 
declared, "We are taking these shops out one at a time."46 
Direct confrontation ebbed for the remainder of the 
spring season as the union completed necessary chores before 
returning to battle. April elections of officers reflected 
the revitalization the new administration had brought when 
collectively locals 65, 84, 96, and 97 polled nearly four 
thousand votes.47 ILGWU members filled the Los Angeles Labor 
Temple, where they agreed to raise fifteen thousand dollars 
in the next few months to begin an immediate "crusade against 
35 open-shop cloak and dress manufacturers" that represented 
the worst of the "hold outs." Vice-president Levy also 
informed the assembled members that their representatives 
would return to the city's Central Labor Council (CLC) for 
the first time in four years. President William Green had 
welcomed the ILGWU back into the American Federation of Labor 
a few days earlier, prompting the CLC's invitation to the 
Ladies' Garment Workers. The union's return to the CLC 
undermined manufacturers' charges that the ILGWU was an 
illegitimate, renegade organization outside of the 
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established labor movement.48 
While Levy, Pesotta, and Wishnak prepared to fight, so 
did opposition groups determined to maintain "the last 
frontier of the open shop." The Southern Californians spent 
eighty-seven thousand dollars in support of a new anti-labor 
group called The Neutral Thousands (TNT). TNT leader Bessie 
Ochs, in collaboration with Harry Chandler at the Los Angeles 
Times, promoted the organization as a "women's front" united 
against union domination. The Southern Californians cut off 
TNT funding when they discovered that the organization's 
rolls had been copied out of the phonebook. Meanwhile, 
members of the Merchants and Manufacturers' Association 
drafted a pact assessing stiff future fines to any associated 
firm that recognized the ILGWU.49 
In late July, five hundred cloak workers waged what 
proved to be the last major garment workers' strike of the 
year. Thousands of sympathy strikers filled the sidewalks, 
maintaining twenty-four hour picket lines around ten 
non-union shops. After a week of total work stoppage, the 
owners and members of the Los Angeles Contractors' 
Association accepted union terms, including reduced hours and 
pay increases. Levy optimistically asserted that "at last 
Los Angeles is a union town as far as the cloak industry is 
concerned."50 
ILGWU bosses devoted the remainder of the year to 
organizing a huge Labor Day celebration, fighting internal 
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political battles, renewing expiring union contracts, and 
orchestrating several minor strikes. In September, Communist 
factions disrupted Joint Board meetings by creating 
"pandemonium" until "stopped by the loyal membership." 
Delegates then voted the Communist dominated committees 
controlling Pressers' Local 97 and Cloakmakers' Local 65 out 
of office. During the same period Pesotta led the effort to 
renegotiate terminated pacts with manufacturers and to renew 
contracts with the Altman Style Shop, Fashion Sportswear, 
Miracle Dress, David Pleating, and the Engel Company.51 A 
successful strike against Film Modes, Incorporated provided 
the ILGWU with its final victory of 1940. The manager of the 
shop, Sid Simon, broke the firm's existing union contract by 
h~ring non-union employees-- including several alleged 
members of the New York underworld. When Simon's thugs 
"encour~ged" workers not to affiliate with the International, 
Pesotta organized picket lines that hastened acceptance of 
union conditions and brought the dismissal of Simon.52 
In February of the new year, Levy's earlier positive 
assessment of the condition of the cloak trade proved 
incorrect. The Vice-president announced the necessity of a 
strike against twenty shops for failing to honor wage 
agreements. After two weeks of picketing, owners announced 
that they would comply with contract stipulations. To Levy 
and his colleagues, the episode made it clear that only 
constant vigilance would prevent deliberate "chiseling." 
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Contract jobbers at work in the cloak industry also withheld 
cooperation, until the union called employee meetings and 
made it clear that walkouts in their own establishments could 
be expected. With the return of union representation in the 
cloak trades came an additional success. The Vogel brothers 
agreed to dismantle their company union and made their coat 
factory a closed shop. After a three year struggle, the 
defiant trio had had enough.53 
The situation in the dress industry at this juncture was 
still troubling. According to Levy, Wishnak and Pesotta 
suffered from a "lack of harmony" making it necessary to put 
Pesotta in charge of sportswear and give Wishnak 
responsibility for the dressmakers. The Pacific Coast 
Director hoped to put a stop to the exchange of accusations 
and the "blame shifting" going on between the two. Upon 
accepting his new assignment, Wishnak expressed pessimism 
about the entire situation and stated that "the possibility 
of organizing the dress industry is out of the question."54 
Wishnak wrote Dubinsky outlining his plans for a strike, 
stating that the outlook was "problematic." Few new workers 
had joined the union, and finances were inadequate. If 
non-union shops continued to function after a general 
walkout, Wishnak feared that his locals would dissolve.55 
As the planned date approached, union officers made 
final strike arrangements in addition to coordinating other 
ILGWU activities. The national office recognized Los Angeles 
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Sportswear Local 384, consisting of employees of the mammoth 
Mode O'Day factory, and Dubinsky arrived in the city to visit 
the International's tuberculosis sanitarium in nearby Duarte, 
California. The union hosted a well-attended fashion show 
supporting organized Los Angeles garment producers and 
promoting the new "World's Sportswear Center."56 Meanwhile, 
Levy summoned San Francisco organizer Jenny Matyas, who 
rapidly assessed the situation and concurred with Wishnak's 
pessimistic predictions. Although aware of his subordinates' 
concerns, Levy insisted that "we must take our chances in 
calling the general strike," and requested an immediate ten 
thousand dollar check from New York.57 Upon returning to the 
national off ice, the frugal Dubinsky wired only five thousand 
dollars to augment the strike fund and two thousand dollars 
to help set up the new sportswear local's headquarters.58 
The general strike began on July 24 and lasted for five 
hot days. The Joint Board unanimously elected Pesotta 
secretary of the strike committee (an honor she attempted to 
refuse) and belatedly informed her that "all dress, blouse, 
skirt, sportswear, and lingerie workers" would be called out. 
Pesotta described her job as a "hot potato" and complained 
that she had specifically warned Levy that only the 
sportswear group was ready. Ready or not, thousands of women 
crowded the sidewalks to be confronted by the Red Squad, 
which transported dozens of workers-- including Pesotta-- to 
the Lincoln Heights Jail for violating picketing 
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ordinances.59 Repeatedly, a policeman knocked Pesotta to the 
pavement and then arrested her for disturbing the peace. A 
local court gave her a suspended sentence for "striking an 
officer" and found her innocent of creating a public 
disturbance.60 Anxiously, Dubinsky telegrammed the Los 
Angeles offices for news, and received notice that although 
most dressmakers were out the response from sportswear and 
other shops was only "fair."61 
Mayor Fletcher Bowron selected a three-man committee to 
mediate negotiations that produced a settlement over the 
weekend. Most owners of shops that had formerly been under 
contract agreed to sign new three-year pacts that limited 
weekly hours and recognized the ILGWU as their employees' 
sole collective bargainer. The conference left two important 
union demands, those for pay increases and overtime pay, up 
for arbitration. Although the general strike was now 
officially over and a "historic triumph," according to 
Justice, scores of resisting shops remained under seige for 
weeks to come.62 
Two weeks into the struggle Wishnak admitted to Dubinsky 
what articles in the labor press had been concealing: the 
campaign was in many ways a failure. Only six traditionally 
non-union dress shops had signed contracts, adding a paltry 
total of two hundred workers to the union's membership. 
Wishnak confessed that "it must be stated that we have not 
succeeded in crippling the shops to a very great extent" and 
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that the union "had only scratched the surface in the 
sportswear industry." Strike-related activities, which 
included radio broadcasts, the renting of a soundtruck, and 
the feeding of hundreds of pickets, resulted in a growing 
financial crisis.63 Levy decided to tax the membership five 
percent of their pay to meet mounting costs, resulting in a 
quarrel among the leadership. Pesotta warned that the 
"income of such a tax may be ridiculously small," but damage 
to the morale of sportswear workers would be "irreparable."64 
Dubinsky supported Levy's tax initiative, but at the same 
time complained of statistical discrepancies in the reports 
he was receiving. Levy claimed that two thousand sportswear 
workers had joined the union, while Wishnak set the figure at 
half that amount. Aspects of the "lack of harmony" that Levy 
had observed between Pesotta and Wishnak seem to have become 
general.65 
Striking against sportswear firms continued into 
September and October, yielding several minor victories for 
the union before the season ended. Sol Sunken and Phil 
Rosenberg of the Sunrose firm hung out the white flag and 
signed a contract on behalf of one hundred employees, after 
resisting a month-long walkout by nearly all the shop's 
laborers. The Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association 
failed in an attempt to secure a court injunction against 
picketing, and strikers at Chic Lingerie withstood arrests 
and police harrassment.66 While Levy turned his attention to 
ILGWU business in Seattle and Portland, the Los Angeles 
locals hosted an "open house," celebrated Halloween, and 
contributed three hundred dollars to the United Service 
Organizations.67 
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Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and the United States's 
subsequent entry into World War Two disrupted plans for 
observing the yuletide holidays. "One of the most horrible 
cases of inhuman infamy, duplicity, treachery, and everything 
else beastly" temporarily superseded labor concerns.68 
Pesotta described the coming of war as the "end of an era"--
the end of labor's organizational drives under the New 
Deal.69 If time had indeed run out for the unionization of 
the Los Angeles garment trades, one must conclude that the 
ILGWU failed to complete its mission. Wishnak estimated that 
sportwear factories alone employed ten thousand people, of 
which two thousand at best were union members. He predicted 
that the International would have to invest "at least 
$100,000 in order to be successful."70 When the new era 
arrived in the wake of Japanese torpedoes, it began with the 
open shop battered but still strong in the Los Angeles 
garment district. 
Several internal factors contributed to the ultimate 
frustration of the ILGWU's agenda. Funding had never been 
sufficient to complete the job, if one accepts Wishnak's 
calculations and considers Dubinsky's thrifty allocation 
habits. Leadership seems to have posed a problem, 
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considering the total replacement of top administrators in 
1939. If charges of corruption against Busick were 
justified, then the old leadership suffered from problems 
worse than mere ineptitude. The "lack of harmony" among new 
organizers and the disruption created by Communist union 
members may also be cited. Finally, the impo~ition of dues 
and taxes in the midst of a depression, however necessary, 
may have partially undermined recruitment campaigns. 
External elements also created an adverse environment 
that exacerbated these problems. A hostile city government 
and police force conspired with the Merchants' and 
Manufacturers' Association, the Chamber of Commerce, the 
Southern Californians, and other labor-haters in resisting 
unionization. Public support that might have forced 
friendlier behavior on the part of government was 
deliberately dampened by a hostile city press-- led by the 
Los Angeles Times. The removal of NRA codes governing wage 
rates seems to have caused a lowering of wage scales in 1935. 
Finally, the constant opposition of employers played perhaps 
the greatest role in frustrating ILGWU plans. Even owners 
who signed contracts often broke their promises or resisted 
renewal agreements, forcing the union to retrace many of its 
steps. A sizable minority of cloak and dress manufacturers, 
and a majority of sportswear shops, never signed a labor pact 
throughout the period. Their stubborn defiance made liars of 
ILGWU organizers who promised to unionize entire industries. 
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In light of all the adversities that the International faced 
in the city of Los Angeles, one may marvel that the 
organization had the degree of success that it did. The 
gradual growth of the union in America's bastion of the open 
shop testifies to the determination of the membership and to 
the intransigence of a powerful management-government 
coalition. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
More than any other factors, the determined opposition 
of hostile manufacturers and weaknesses in the ILGWU regional 
leadership produced the union's failure in Los Angeles. 
Significantly, both of these causes were local in nature. As 
the following discussion will demonstrate, conditions in Los 
Angeles were consistent with trends witnessed nationally 
regarding responses to federal legislation, business defiance 
of labor, and the activities of the left. Although the 
conflict between the AFL and the CIO involved the ILGWU as a 
whole, there is little evidence that the dispute had much 
effect upon Los Angeles garment workers' locals. The case of 
the Los Angeles ILGWU underscores the importance of regional 
environment that many histories tend to ignore. While New 
Deal legislation provided the impetus for labor activism, 
often unique conditions within each community determined the 
success or failure of unionization. 
Stubb0rn manufacturers deserve much of the blame for the 
union's failure to effectively organize the Los Angeles 
garment district. Allied in the defense of maximum profits, 
they enjoyed the assistance of powerful allies. During the 
1933 general strike and later labor disputes, shop owners 
paid at least a portion of the city police department to 
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harass union members. Manufacturers spent a fortune in paid 
advertising to discredit the ILGWU and anti-labor newspapers 
like the Los Angeles Times assisted them by printing 
anti-union stories and editorials. Individual companies like 
the one owned by the Vogel brothers went to extreme lengths 
to preserve the open shop, and many succeeded throughout the 
interwar period. 
A weak and divided union leadership also undermined the 
building of an effective labor organization. Rose Pesotta 
and her asssociates initiated the 1933 general strike against 
Dubinsky's advice, straining the relationship between the New 
York and Los Angeles offices for the duration of the 
walk-out. Local leaders failed to report strike developments 
to the union president on a regular basis in both 1933 and 
1941, resulting in his annoyance. Apparently the Los Angeles 
office initiated many projects, such as the publication of 
the Organizer, without Dubinsky's knowledge. This probably 
reinforced his legendary reluctance to disburse financial 
assistance. After the conclusion of the 1933 organizing 
campaign, inexperienced leaders took control of the battered 
Los Angeles locals, failing to build on the gains of the 
previous year. 
Communists like Ivan Lutsky gained control of the city 
organization between 1934 and 1939, resulting in internal 
fighting that hurt the union and aided its enemies. 
Opponents of the leadership accused it of showing favoritism 
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toward party members, while the manufacturers used the issue 
of Communist influence to discredit the ILGWU. Regardless of 
the Communists' true intentions, their presence damaged the 
union effort, and membership levels failed to increase 
despite all of their efforts. It should also be mentioned 
that the alleged corruption involving Bill Busick occurred 
during the same period. Busick was not a Communist, but 
Lutsky was responsible for monitoring his behavior while 
managing the city union. By purging the Los Angeles 
leadership in 1939, Dubinsky acknowledged that the city 
organization had problems, but his new appointees had 
troubles of their own. 
Louis Levy, the new leader of the Pacific region, had 
health problems that prevented him from vigorously fulfilling 
his responsibilities. George Wishnak and Rose Pesotta had a 
personality clash and disagreed over the union's prospects 
and its course of direction. Wishnak was cautious and 
pessimistic by nature, while Pesotta was impulsive and 
optimistic. The result was widely conflicting status reports 
that forced the New York off ice to guess at what the real 
situation in Los Angeles was. As union president, Dubinsky 
was in part responsible for all of these problems, but as the 
head of a national union he had many competing priorities. 
Reactions in Los Angeles concerning federal legislation 
were fairly typical. The passage of the NIRA in 1933 
resulted in numerous strikes and a surge in union 
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participation. Unfortunately, the California Labor Board 
created by the National Recovery Administration proved to be 
as as inefficient as those elsewhere. When the Supreme Court 
overturned the Act in 1935, wages declined and some shop 
owners began ignoring their ILGWU contracts. Initially the 
passage of the National Labor Relations Act brought little 
change, because area manufacturers expected the Supreme Court 
to rule it unconstitutional. Despite these expectations, the 
Wagner Act survived judicial review and the reorganized NLRB 
in California proved to be more effective than its 
predecessor. The NLRB settled some disputes in the ILGWU's 
favor, while the old NRA board seemed more responsive to 
business interests. 
The resistance tactics that clothing manufacturers used 
against the Ladies' Garment Workers resembled those 
implemented against labor groups across the country. 
Shopowners created merchants' associations that used 
blacklisting and discriminatory firing to discourage 
employees from joining the ILGWU. Company unions prevented 
authentic collective bargaining, and manufacturers waged 
expensive legal struggles to protect them. When workers 
walked out on strike, paid strikebreakers used violence to 
intimidate picketers. Managers hired scab replacements to 
ruin the effectiveness of stoppages, and threatened to stage 
lockouts-- although these never occurred. Some manufacturers 
moved their factories to the suburbs to escape the union, 
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paralleling the runaway shop phenomenon observed in the east. 
Perhaps shopowners never resorted to lethal force because 
most picketers were female, and the murder of women would 
have yielded bad publicity. 
The activities of the Communists and Socialists in the 
Los Angeles ILGWU fit the national pattern. The Communist 
Needle Trades Union was active while the CP's dual union 
policy existed, only to be dismantled in conjunction with the 
Trade Union Unity League. Then Communists infiltrated the 
ILGWU only to face eventual expulsion. It is not remarkable 
that the Communists succeeded in gaining power within the 
garment workers' locals, because the radical politics of 
needle workers was traditional. The Socialist party failed 
to initiate any coordinated action, but at least one 
Socialist participated in local ILGWU activities. Rose 
Pesotta was a Socialist like the union president who employed 
her, and had had close ties to anarchist organizations during 
her adolescence in Russia. Like Dubinsky, Pesotta became an 
ardent supporter of FDR and the New Deal while never 
departing from her earlier convictions. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that several 
questions remain unanswered. With the materials that the 
writer amassed, the extent to which ethnicity affected union 
growth is unclear. A large percentage of Los Angeles ::eedle 
workers were Chicanos, but exact statistics are unavailable. 
The issue is complicated by the undocumented employment of 
Mexican nationals and the existence of illegal shops run by 
subcontractors. 
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Likewise, the records of the Chamber of Commerce and the 
Los Angeles Police Department remain untapped. After 
receiving a request for access to its records, the Chamber of 
Commerce sent a printed brocure explaining that its mission 
is strictly to promote Los Angeles business. Apparently 
historical inquiry does not promote business. The Los 
Angeles Police Department denied a request for a list of 
strike related arrests and any other information that might 
be legally released. 
A final question involves union records. Little Los 
Angeles documentation or correspondence appears to exist 
dating from the late 1930s-- the same time at which the 
expulsion of the Communist factions occurred. Perhaps there 
was a lapse in record keeping, but that seems unlikely. It 
is possible that someone decided to destroy materials that 
might prove a source of future embarrassment. Fortunately, 
surviving sources are sufficient to construct an adequate 
account of the period. 
Despite the criticisms contained in this study the noble 
character of the ILGWU's efforts in Los Angeles should be 
recognized. The union battled in the interests of those who 
could not defend themselves, and most of its organizers 
worked tirelessly for minimal pay. Leaders like Pesotta 
risked personal harm and went to jail in support of striking 
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laborers. Considering the strength of the opposition, it is 
not certain whether any leadership could have engineered 
successes comparable to those won on the east coast. 
Although absolute victory remained beyond reach, the ILGWU 
represented a continual threat to the open shop. The 
viciousness of the manufacturers' counter-attacks showed a 
measure of respect for the capabilities of their union 
enemies. The limited advances made during the New Deal 
provided the basis for further union growth in the postwar 
era. 
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APPENDIX A 
LOS ANGELES ILGWU MEMBERSHIP STATISTICS 
lQG 
LOS ANGELES ILGWU MEMBERSHIP ROLLS- FALL, 1941 
Local 
84 
96 
97 
Total 
Local 
65 
84 
97 
Total 
Local 
384 
DRESSMAKERS 
• 124 
. 933 
• 101 
1158 (75% to 80% in good standing) 
CLOAKMAKERS 
1666 
• 154 
• 274 
2094 
SPORTSWFAR WORKERS 
• 500 
TOTAL ILGWU MEMBERS: ••• 3752 
WOMEN'S GARMENT WORKERS IN L.A.: approx. 18000 
(The union's latest census, taken in 1939, recorded a total 
of 15890 workers in 631 shops. *Report of the General 
Executive Board, May 27- June 9, 1944.) 
Informati0n taken from the Los Angeles Joint Board Balance 
Sheet, September 1, 1941, and from Pesotta to Dubinsky, 
Dubinsky Correspondence, December 2, 1941 (Cornell Labor 
Management Documentation Center). 
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APPENDIX B 
CENTRAL LOS ANGELES MAP FOR THE 
1933 DRESSMAKERS' STRIKE 
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*This map depicts the sites of strike activity mentioned. in the 
Los Angeles Times, the Los Angeles Citizen, and the Los Angeles 
Illustrated Daily News. According to the Citizen, Captain Hynes's 
police patrolled the area between ?th and 10th, beginning at 
Broadway and ending at Maple. 
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APPENDIX C 
CENTRAL LOS ANGELES MAP FOR THE 
1941 GENERAL STRIKE 
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